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I. INTRODUCTION
All or nothing. For years this idea of absolutes has been a hallmark
of tort law despite the inequities it has caused. Plaintiffs must either
win a total victory or suffer total defeat. In recent years courts and leg-
islatures have begun to recognize the injustice of the all-or-nothing ap-
proach and to replace it with rules that permit partial recoveries that
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are more equitably tailored to the particular facts of each case.' The
most dramatic example of this more equitable approach is the nearly
universal rejection of contributory negligence in favor of comparative
fault in negligence cases. 2 Almost all jurisdictions, however, still refuse
to use comparative fault when defendant is alleged to have committed
an intentional tort;3 in that case, the all-or-nothing approach still
prevails.
1. Although comparative fault, which is discussed in the text, is the most obvious example of
this new approach, there are others. For example, market share liability has enabled injured plain-
tiffs to obtain some compensation for their injuries even though they were unable to prove which
of many negligent parties injured them. See, for example, Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,
509 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Tex. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982); Sindell v.
Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924 (1980); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166,
342 N.W.2d 37 (1984). Similarly, a plaintiff who cannot prove that defendant's carelessness proba-
bly caused her injuries sometimes is permitted to recover for the value of her lost chance to avoid
those injuries. See, for example, Scafidi v. Seiler, 119 N.J. 93, 574 A.2d 398 (1990). Under this
approach, if, for example, defendant's negligence caused someone to lose a 25% chance of being
cured of a fatal illness, a proper plaintiff could recover the value of that lost chance even though
she had not proven that defendant, more likely than not, had caused the decedent's death.
2. Some form of comparative fault is presently used in 46 states. Alaska (Alaska Stat. 8
09.17.060 (Supp. 1991); Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975)); Arizona (Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. §§ 12-2505, 12-2509 (West Supp. 1991)); Arkansas (Ark. Stat. Ann. § 16-64-122 (Supp. 1991));
California (Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of Cal., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226 (1975)); Colorado (1989
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-111); Connecticut (Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-572 (West 1977)); Delaware
(10 Del. Code Ann. § 8132 (Supp. 1990)); Florida (Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.81 (West Supp. 1992);
Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973)); Georgia (Ga. Code Ann. §§ 51-11-7, 51-12-33
(Michie 1982 and Supp. 1992)); Hawaii (Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 663-31 (1988)); Idaho (Idaho Code §§
6-801 to 6-806 (1990)); Illinois ((Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 110, §§ 2-1107.1, 2-1116, 2-1117 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1992)); Indiana (Ind. Code Ann. §§ 34-4-33-3 to 34-4-33-13 (Supp. 1992)); Iowa (Iowa Code
Ann. § 668.1-668.3 (West 1987)); Kansas (Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 60-258a, 60-258b (Supp. 1991)); Ken-
tucky (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 411.182 (1992)); Louisiana (La. Civ. Code Ann. § 2323 (West Supp.
1992)); Maine (14 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 156 (1980)); Massachusetts (Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch.
231, § 85 (West 1985)); Michigan ()Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638, 275 N.W.2d
511 (1979)]; Minnesota (Minn. Stat. Ann. § 604.01 (West Supp. 1992)]; Mississippi (Miss. Code
Ann. § 11-7-15 (1972)]; Missouri (Mo. Ann. Stat. § 537.765 (Vernon 1988); Gustafson v. Benda, 661
S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1983)); Montana (Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-702 (1991)); Nebraska (Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 25-21, 185 (1989)); Nevada (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.141 (Supp. 1991)); New Hampshire (N.H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §§ 507:7-d, 507:7-e (Equity Supp. 1991)); New Jersey (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:15-5.1 to
2A:15-5.3 (West 1987 and Supp. 1992)); New Mexico (Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234
(1981)); New York (N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law §§ 1411-1413 (McKinney 1976)); North Dakota (N.D.
Cent. Code §§ 32-03.2-01 to 32.03.2-03 (Supp. 1991)); Ohio (Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2315.19,
2315.20 (Baldwin 1990)); Oklahoma (23 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 13 (West 1987)); Oregon (Or. Rev. Stat.
§§ 18.470 to 18.490 (1988)); Pennsylvania (42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 7102 (Purdon 1983 and Supp.
1992)); Rhode Island (R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-20-4 (1985)); South Carolina (Nelson v. Concrete Supply
Co., 303 S.C. 243, 399 S.E. 2d 783 (1991)); South Dakota (S.D. Cod. Laws § 20-9-2 (1987)); Tennes-
see (McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W. 2d 52 (1992)); Texas (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§
33.001 to 33.013 (Vernon 1986)); Utah (Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-37 to 78-27-43 (1992)); Vermont
(12 Vt. Stat. Ann. § 1036 (Equity Supp. 1992)); Washington (Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 4.22.005,
4.22.015, 4.22.070 (West 1988)); West Virginia (Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 163 W. Va. 332,
256 S.E.2d 879 (1979)); Wisconsin (Wis. Stat. Ann. § 895.045 (West 1983)); Wyoming (Wyo. Stat. §
1-1-109 (1991)).
3. Victor E. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence § 5.2 at 97 (Allen Smith, 2d ed. 1986); Henry
Woods, Comparative Fault § 7.1 at 165 (Lawyers, 2d ed. 1987).
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Admittedly, the perpetrators of certain intentional torts should not
benefit from comparative fault rules: why, for example, should a thief
be able to avoid paying the full value of the items he stole by proving
that the victim was careless in leaving her possessions unguarded? On
the other hand, it takes little imagination to conceive of intentional tort
situations in which resort to comparative fault is quite appealing. To
use an example familiar to many law students, a defendant who, while
legally hunting wolves, shoots at, hits, and kills plaintiff's dog, which
looks exactly like a wolf, has committed an intentional tort.4 The dog's
owner may recover the full value of the dog even though defendant rea-
sonably believed he was shooting a wolf. But what if the dog owner was
negligent in releasing his wolf-like dog during wolf-hunting season?'
Why should this negligence be ignored in determining the extent of de-
fendant's liability? Had defendant been negligent (suppose, for exam-
ple, he aimed at a wolf but carelessly hit plaintiff's dog), plaintiff's fault
in releasing the dog would have been used either to reduce defendant's
liability or to bar plaintiff from all recovery.' Although the equities
New Jersey recently decided that comparative fault should be used in intentional tort cases,
Blazovic v. Andrich, 124 N.J. 90, 590 A.2d 222 (1991), and New York has compared fault in many
intentional tort cases for some time. See, for example, Comeau v. Lucas, 90 A.D.2d 674, 455
N.Y.S.2d 871 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982). But see City of New York v. Corwen, 164 A.D.2d 212, 565
N.Y.S.2d 457 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990). Louisiana appellate courts have held that comparative fault
should be used in battery cases in which plaintiff provoked the battery. See, for example, Baugh v.
Redmond, 565 So. 2d 953, 959 (La. Ct. App. 1990); Jones v. Thomas, 557 So. 2d 1015, 1017 (La.
App. 1990); Kennedy v. Parrino, 555 So. 2d 990, 994 (La. Ct. App. 1990).
4. See Ranson v. Kitner, 31 Ill. App. 241 (1888). Many authorities find the idea that liability
should be imposed on a morally innocent person, simply because the physical result that he in-
tended turns out not to be permitted by the law, hard to justify. Holmes stated that it was "argua-
ble" that defendants should not be held liable "unless, judged by average standards, [they are] also
to blame for what [they did]." Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The Common Law, 163 (Little, Brown, 1881).
Many intentional tort defendants would not be held liable under such a standard.
Prosser, as well as Harper, James, and Gray, contends that holding the morally innocent de-
fendant liable "can be justified only upon the basis of a policy which makes the defendant respon-
sible for the physical result which he intended, and, as between two parties equally free from
moral blame, places the loss upon the one who made the mistake." W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser
and Keeton on Torts § 17 at 110 (West, 5th ed. 1984). See also Fowler V. Harper, Fleming James,
Jr., and Oscar S. Gray, 1 The Law of Torts § 2.8 at 158 (Little, Brown, 2d ed. 1986). This may
explain some cases, but it does not justify the result in the hypothetical discussed in the text in
which the party who is free of moral blame is required to pay the blameworthy party. This Article
does not explore the reasons for imposing liability in cases like Ranson. Instead, it assumes that
liability is proper in that type case, but argues that plaintiff's fault should be considered in deter-
mining the amount of her recovery.
5. Little doubt exists that the dog's owner would have a negligence cause of action against
someone to whom she had entrusted the dog who released it under these circumstances. Accord-
ingly, the release of the dog seems to be negligent.
6. This bar would occur in contributory negligence jurisdictions and in modified comparative
fault jurisdictions if the jury found that plaintiff's share of the fault exceeded the stated threshold,
thus triggering the use of contributory negligence.
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favor the morally innocent intentional tort defendant over both this
negligent defendant and the negligent plaintiff, the law presently insists
that the intentional tort defendant pay the negligent plaintiff in full
but allows the negligent defendant either to escape without any liability
or to pay for only part of the damage.
Many other, less familiar, fact patterns also indicate that compara-
tive fault should be used in certain intentional tort cases. For example,
in some cases an intentional tort will exist only if defendant negligently
assessed the situation in which he acted.' In McCummings v. New York
City Transit Authority,' plaintiff was shot by the police and seriously
wounded while trying to escape from the scene of a crime in which he
had beaten and choked a seventy-two-year-old man. Plaintiff sued, and
the jury concluded that, because defendant's use of force had been ex-
cessive, plaintiff was entitled to damages, which were assessed at
$4,343,721.24. Defendant's fault was carelessly misassessing the situa-
tion and therefore using more force than was permitted. Should not the
jury be allowed to conclude that plaintiff's conduct in beating the man
and running away when the police sought to arrest him was both
blameworthy and a proximate cause of his injury? If it was, why should
that fault be ignored in establishing damages?
Intentional tort cases in which defendant erroneously thought he
had plaintiff's consent may also present situations in which comparative
fault should be used. Suppose, for example, that defendant injured
plaintiff during an Indian wrestling match.9 At the time they agreed to
the match, both plaintiff and defendant were drunk. Plaintiff claimed
that she was so intoxicated that her consent to the match was invalid.
Defendant did not think that plaintiff was too drunk to consent. If
plaintiff was too drunk to consent, defendant's conduct may constitute
a battery. Nevertheless, should not plaintiff's fault be considered? It
would be incongruous to hold defendant fully liable while completely
excusing plaintiff's nearly identical faulty conduct, which also contrib-
uted to her injury.
In other intentional tort cases, defendants are held liable even
though they were not morally at fault. Thus, good faith purchasers of
stolen goods are converters, and in some jurisdictions private persons
who arrest others under the mistaken belief that those arrested have
committed a crime are liable for false arrest no matter how reasonable
their belief that the arrestee committed the crime.'0 If in such a case
7. For a more complete discussion of this type of case, see text accompanying note 121.
8. 177 A.D.2d 24, 580 N.Y.S.2d 931 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).
9. This example is similar to Hollerud v. Malamis, 20 Mich. App. 748, 174 N.W.2d 626
(1970).
10. See, for example, Lindquist v. Friedman's, Inc., 366 Ill. 232, 8 N.E.2d 625 (1937).
1993]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
plaintiff's fault contributed to her injury, why should that fault be ig-
nored? It was proper for the court in Lindquist v. Friedman's, Inc." to
hold that defendant had falsely imprisoned plaintiffs when he detained
them after they had used a counterfeit bill to pay for merchandise in
defendant's store; the crime for which plaintiffs were detained required
that they know that the bill was counterfeit, and they allegedly did not.
If plaintiffs should have known that the bill was counterfeit, however,
why not permit the jury to conclude that the plaintiffs' ignorance was
negligence that should be considered in deciding damages? Similarly, if
plaintiff's diamond ring, which plaintiff had carelessly left in a place
where it was likely to be stolen, was stolen and later purchased by de-
fendant, a good faith purchaser, should not plaintiff's fault in carelessly
encouraging the theft be considered in determining the amount of
money the good faith purchaser should have to pay to plaintiff?.
Cases in which defendant did not intend the injury of which plain-
tiff complains but is nevertheless held liable under the liberal damage
rules associated with intentional torts also call for the use of compara-
tive fault. For example, in Rogers v. Board of Road Comm'rs for Kent
County,'2 decedent was injured when his mowing machine hit a post
that defendant had failed to remove from decedent's land. If the post
was visible and should have been seen by decedent had he been paying
proper attention, why should the decedent's carelessness be ignored
simply because defendant had committed the intentional tort of tres-
pass by failing (apparently carelessly) to remove the post?
Finally, cases arise in which plaintiff's provocation of defendant
clearly should be reflected in any damage award. For example, in Jones
v. Thomas'3 plaintiff objected when defendant told him it was time to
take a break from work. An argument developed. When a supervisor
told them to stop arguing, defendant walked away, but plaintiff contin-
ued to direct "rank profanity and threats of physical violence"14 toward
defendant. After about ten minutes of this verbal assault, plaintiff
called defendant a "black motherfucker,"' 5 threatened to kick his
"black ass,"' 6 and threatened to kill defendant's mother and burn down
his house.'7 At this point, defendant finally lost control and punched
plaintiff. Even though defendant committed an intentional tort, plain-
11. Id. For a more recent case involving somewhat similar considerations, see Jacques v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 30 N.Y.2d 466, 285 N.E.2d 871 (1972).
12. 319 Mich. 661, 30 N.W.2d 358 (1948).
13. 557 So. 2d 1015 (La. Ct. App. 1990).
14. Id. at 1016.
15. Id. at 1017 n.2.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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tiff's provocation clearly should be considered in determining
damages.18
The thesis of this Article is that comparative fault"9 ought to gov-
ern the liability of my hypothetical wolf hunter, as well as the liability
of the other defendants mentioned above and other similarly situated
intentional tortfeasors. The reasons for using comparative fault in many
intentional tort cases are discussed in Part II. Part III considers the
justifications that have been offered to support the refusal to use com-
parative fault in these cases and finds them wanting. A system for de-
termining when the use of comparative fault is appropriate in
intentional tort cases is explained in Part IV. Part V explores the ad-
ministrative costs that might be associated with the use of comparative
fault in these cases.
II. REASONS FOR USING COMPARATIVE FAULT IN INTENTIONAL TORT
CASES
The primary reason for using comparative fault in most types of
intentional tort cases2 ° is simple: it is fair to do so. Fairness undoubt-
edly is a major objective of the law, and "the keystone to fairness is
proportionate responsibility for fault . .. [with] [e]ach party's recov-
ery . . . [being] reduced in proportion to that party's responsibil-
ity . [so that] no one is unjustly enriched."'" Although this
18. Although this Louisiana court concluded that comparative fault should be used, most
courts, unfortunately, would disagree.
19. Professor McNichols has suggested that the term "comparative responsibility" should
replace "comparative fault." William J. McNichols, Should Comparative Responsibility Ever Ap-
ply to Intentional Torts, 37 Okla. L. Rev. 641 (1984). "Comparative responsibility" certainly bet-
ter expresses what is done when, for example, a jury in a strict liability case is asked to determine
how plaintiff's fault compares to the total amount of fault of all the parties. Nevertheless, I have
decided to use the term "comparative fault" because it is the more familiar term and because, for
the most part, my discussion is limited to cases in which both parties were at fault so that "com-
parative fault" accurately describes the situation.
Furthermore, the adoption of comparative responsibility would raise additional issues that are
beyond the scope of this Article. For example, some of the all-or-nothing aspects of the privilege
rules probably should be replaced by some type of comparative responsibility that is not based on
the parties' fault. Under the approach presently used, a defendant who reasonably but incorrectly
believes he must defend himself is privileged to use reasonable force for that purpose. If in doing
so he injures a totally innocent plaintiff, defendant pays nothing. Comparative responsibility might
provide a way to divide the damages between such a plaintiff and defendant, and given plaintiff's
innocence and defendant's error, protecting this defendant from full liability may be sufficient
protection of his interests. Such possibilities raise issues that have little to do with comparative
fault and thus will not be fully discussed.
20. In certain instances, defendant's conduct may disable him from asserting that plaintiff's
fault should be considered. These instances are discussed in the first full paragraph following the
text accompanying note 129 and in notes 136-47. In addition, the remedy provided in conversion
cases makes the use of comparative fault undesirable in some of these cases. See note 118.
21. Goetzman v. Wichern, 327 N.W.2d 742, 754 (Iowa 1982). Those scholars who championed
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statement supports the conclusion that allocating damages according to
fault advances fairness, it fails to tell us why this is true. Two reasons
appear to exist. First, fairness requires that courts treat plaintiffs and
defendants consistently; when defendant is held liable because he was
at fault in causing an injury, it is inconsistent to relieve plaintiff, who
was also at fault in causing the injury, of all responsibility. Second, ig-
noring plaintiff's faulty conduct contradicts our fundamental belief that
people should bear some responsibility for injuries caused by their sub-
standard conduct.
The inconsistent treatment of plaintiffs and defendants, both of
whose carelessness contributed to plaintiff's injury, was most patent in
negligence cases in which the contributory negligence rule required
courts to absolve defendants of liability and impose the entire loss on
plaintiffs. The inconsistency of imposing the full loss on one person be-
cause she had been negligent, while excusing the other despite his negli-
gence, was dramatic. Once courts and legislatures realized that this
inequitable treatment was not necessary because losses could be di-
vided, most jurisdictions replaced contributory negligence with compar-
ative fault.
There is more to the lure of comparative fault, however, than cor-
recting the disparate treatment accorded to plaintiffs and defendants.
Although that inconsistency may explain the dominance of comparative
fault in negligence cases, it cannot explain why most courts faced with
the issue have held that comparative fault should be used in strict lia-
bility cases.22 In those cases, the traditional rule was to ignore plaintiff's
fault.23 Ignoring plaintiff's fault, however, was not inconsistent with the
treatment accorded defendant whose fault-or lack of it-also was ir-
relevant. Thus, the reason for using comparative fault in strict liability
cases cannot lie in a reluctance to treat the parties differently.
It might be argued that the attraction of comparative fault in strict
liability cases arises from the inconsistency of treating strict liability
defendants, who have not been shown to have been at fault, more
sternly than negligence defendants, who clearly were at fault. Making
faultless people pay more than careless people is anomalous, but that
anomaly always existed. In fact, under a contributory negligence re-
gime, the anomaly is greater, for then the careless plaintiff's full recov-
the use of comparative fault in negligence cases also relied on the injustice of visiting the entire
loss on one of two faulty parties. See, for example, William L. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51
Mich. L. Rev. 465 (1953); Ernest A. Turk, Comparative Negligence on the March, 28 Chi. Kent L.
Rev. 189 (1950).
22. Keeton, et al., Torts § 65 at 478 (cited in note 4); Woods, Comparative Fault §§ 14.42-
14.48 at 363-74 (cited in note 3).
23. Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 515, 524 (1976).
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ery in strict liability must be compared to no recovery in negligence.
The use of comparative fault in negligence cases ameliorates this anom-
aly and thus should decrease the pressure to change the traditional rule
that plaintiffs' carelessness is irrelevant in strict liability cases. Never-
theless, the availability of comparative fault has had the opposite effect:
instead of strengthening the position that plaintiffs' negligence is irrele-
vant in strict liability cases, it has caused many courts to conclude that
plaintiffs' fault should be considered. One reason for this effect may be
that comparative fault provides a way to avoid the anomaly of treating
strict liability defendants more harshly than negligence defendants
without imposing unduly harsh results on plaintiffs.
There is a more fundamental reason, however, for using compara-
tive fault in these cases; it is our strongly held belief "that persons are
responsible for their acts to the extent their fault contributes to an in-
jurious result."'24 When plaintiffs' faults were causes of their injuries, we
think those faults should be considered in assessing damages even
though defendants are being held liable for reasons that have little to
do with fault. This belief in responsibility for injuries caused by faulty
actions is reflected in the law's initial decision to hold defendants liable
because they were at fault, supports the use of comparative fault in
negligence cases, and is a major reason why, once comparative fault was
available, many courts changed the law to consider plaintiffs' fault in
strict liability cases.
Both of these reasons for concluding that comparative fault should
be used in negligence and strict liability cases also apply in intentional
tort cases. First, although the conflict between the treatment accorded
to plaintiffs and defendants often is not as direct2 5 in intentional tort
cases as it is in negligence suits, it exists. The law's refusal to consider
plaintiffs' fault in intentional tort cases is inconsistent with its decision
to hold defendants liable because they were at fault26 in causing the
24. Friedrich K. Juenger, Brief For Negligence Law Section of the State Bar of Michigan in
Support of Comparative Negligence as Amicus Curiae, Parsons v. Construction Equipment Com-
pany, 18 Wayne L. Rev. 3, 50 (1972).
The same conclusion was reached by the Supreme Court of California, which could discern no
policy reason why that share of plaintiff's damages that flows from her own fault should be borne
by others. "Such a result would directly contravene the principle . . . that loss should be assessed
equitably in proportion to fault." Daly v. Gen. Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 737, 575 P.2d 1162,
1169 (1978).
25. In negligence cases both parties were careless. In intentional tort cases, one may have
acted negligently and the other intentionally. These differences are merely differences in degree,
which supply no reason for refusing to compare one type of fault with the other. See the discussion
of the differences between negligence and intent in the text accompanying notes 50-79.
When both parties' fault was intentional, the inconsistent treatment of the parties is just as
stark in intentional tort suits as it is in negligence cases.
26. For example, a defendant who injures someone in an unavoidable accident is not liable,
19931
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harm. If engaging in faulty conduct that is a proximate cause of an in-
jury results in liability for defendant, consistency requires that it have
the same consequence for plaintiff. Second, the desire to hold plaintiffs
responsible for losses caused by their fault should arise in intentional
tort cases as it does in negligence and strict liability suits. Because
plaintiffs' faulty conduct often would be the same in all of these cases,
identical reasons to hold them accountable exist.
If these goals of imposing responsibility for losses caused by faulty
conduct and according consistent treatment to all parties are never suf-
ficient to justify the use of comparative fault in intentional tort cases,
as the present blanket refusal to do so indicates, the reason must be
that the use of comparative fault in these cases would undermine some
more important goal of intentional tort law. This, however, does not
appear to be true.
For the most part, the goals of intentional tort liability are the
same as those of negligence liability: indicating that society finds cer-
tain behavior undesirable, deterring and perhaps punishing that unde-
sirable behavior, and compensating some people who have suffered
injury. One goal of negligence liability-loss spreading-is not an objec-
tive of intentional tort liability because generally it cannot be achieved
by imposing liability on intentional tortfeasors17 However, although
one goal of negligence liability is absent in intentional tort cases, the
remaining goals are similar. Given this similarity of objectives, it is dif-
ficult to conclude that the goals of intentional tort liability and negli-
gence liability differ enough to require that plaintiffs' fault be ignored
in intentional tort cases even though it properly is considered in negli-
gence cases. Consequently, comparative fault should be used in both
types of cases.
This conclusion, based on the similarity between the goals of inten-
tional tort liability and negligence liability, is buttressed by the fact
that the use of comparative fault in intentional tort cases would not
prevent the courts from achieving their deterrence 28 and punishment 9
objectives. In addition the fact that defendant still would be required to
compensate plaintiff somewhat would send a message that society finds
defendant's behavior objectionable. The goal of compensating the in-
save in those few instances covered by strict liability. Keeton, et al., Torts § 29 at 162 (cited in
note 4).
27. See text accompanying notes 31-32.
28. See text accompanying notes 106-09. It could be argued that the use of comparative fault
actually would advance deterrence by deterring plaintiffs from engaging in improper conduct. This
seems unlikely, however, as discussed with respect to defendants in the text accompanying notes
106-09.
29. See text accompanying notes 97-100.
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jured would not be fully achieved because the careless plaintiff would
not recover for all her damages. As discussed more fully below, 0 how-
ever, compensating plaintiffs may not be the real goal. It makes little
sense to compensate one victim for her loss by imposing a greater loss
on someone else, thereby creating a more needy victim.
The appeal of the compensation goal lies in the fact that the de-
fendant in negligence and strict liability cases usually can spread the
loss more easily. In such cases defendants typically are covered by in-
surance, and when the losses are associated with the sale of an item or
even a service, they often can be passed along through price increases.
In one way or another, the loss is dispersed by imposing it on defend-
ant. In intentional tort cases, however, it is unlikely that defendants are
better able than plaintiffs to spread losses. Because few intentional
torts arise in sales situations, intentional tort defendants seem to be no
better able than plaintiffs to pass along losses by increasing prices. In
addition, these defendants' insurance may not provide a way to dis-
tribute losses because liability insurance does not cover many inten-
tional torts. 1 In fact, intentional tort defendants as a group probably
are less able than plaintiffs to distribute losses because plaintiffs often
have first party insurance to cover much of their loss. 32 As a result, the
courts' refusal to use comparative fault in intentional tort cases often
causes the loss to be imposed on the person least able to spread it.
Moreover, by imposing the entire loss on one party instead of dividing
it between plaintiff and defendant, the anti-comparative-fault rule fur-
ther concentrates losses.
Thus, the use of comparative fault in intentional tort cases might
advance loss spreading, would not undermine deterrence or punish-
ment, and would not counteract the message presently sent that society
disapproves of the behavior of intentional tortfeasors. Once again, it
seems that comparative fault should be used.
Finally, it should be noted that considering plaintiff's fault in in-
tentional tort cases is nothing new.33 Despite the courts' recognition of
the importance of plaintiff's fault in these cases, their all-or-nothing ap-
proach prevented them from reaching decisions that reflected both par-
ties' fault. When plaintiff's fault was sufficiently egregious to justify
30. See text accompanying notes 110-13.
31. Robert E. Keeton and Alan I. Widiss, Insurance Law, a Guide to the Fundamental Prin-
ciples, Legal Doctrines, and Commercial Practices, 493-94 (West, student ed. 1988).
32. Over 80% of accident victims have health and accident insurance. Victor E. Schwartz,
Comparative Negligence 210 (Allen Smith, 2d ed. 1986).
33. For example, defendant presently is protected by a privilege if plaintiff "intentionally or
negligently" caused defendant to believe that certain facts existed. Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 77 (1963). See also id. §§ 88, 101, 119.
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imposing the full loss on her, the courts did so by finding the defendant
privileged. When plaintiff's fault was less significant, courts ignored it
and imposed the full loss on the defendant. In this limited way, the
courts, burdened by their all-or-nothing mindset, did as much as they
could to recognize the relevance of plaintiff's fault in intentional tort
cases. Comparative fault provides a method, unavailable when losses
are held to be indivisible, to take account of both parties' fault, thereby
enhancing the courts' ability to consider what has always been an im-
portant facet of each case. Thus, comparative fault should be a wel-
comed refinement to the present system of assigning liability in
intentional tort cases.
In sum, the use of comparative fault in some intentional tort cases
would promote fairness by allocating losses equitably. It would elimi-
nate the inconsistent treatment presently accorded to plaintiffs and de-
fendants in these suits and, unlike the existing rule, would honor our
strong belief that people should bear some responsibility for losses
caused by their faulty conduct. Furthermore, the use of comparative
fault in intentional tort cases would advance the goal of loss spreading,
and might even prevent some losses by deterring plaintiffs from endan-
gering themselves. Moreover, this could be achieved through the use of
comparative fault without foregoing the deterrence or punishment of
defendant. In view of these potential benefits of using comparative fault
in intentional tort cases, why has it not been done?
III. JUSTIFICATIONS OFFERED TO SUPPORT THE BLANKET PROHIBITION
ON THE USE OF COMPARATIVE FAULT IN INTENTIONAL TORT CASES
Although courts rarely give any policy reasons why plaintiff's fault
should be irrelevant in an intentional tort case,34 a few have attempted
to justify that conclusion. The following justifications have been
offered.
A. Plaintiff's Fault Must Be Ignored to Circumvent the Harsh
Results Imposed by Contributory Negligence
Before the advent of comparative fault, a major reason for the
courts' refusal to consider plaintiffs' contributory fault in intentional
tort cases was their dissatisfaction with the harsh effect of the contribu-
34. See, for example, Greycas, Inc. v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560 (7th Cir. 1987); Munoz v. Olin, 76
Cal. App. 3d 85 (1977), vacated on other grounds, 24 Cal. 3d 629, 596 P.2d 1143 (1979); Finnigan v.
Sandoval, 43 Colo. App. 219, 600 P.2d 123 (1979); Dep't of Corrections v. Hill, 490 So. 2d 118 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1986), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 513 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 1987); Terrell v. Hester, 182
Ga. App. 160, 355 S.E.2d 97 (1987); Fitzgerald v. Young, 105 Idaho 539, 670 P.2d 1324 (Ct. App.
1983); Cruz v. Montoya, 660 P.2d 723 (Utah 1983); Stephan v. Lynch, 136 Vt. 226, 388 A.2d 376,
379 (1978); Schulze v. Kleeber, 10 Wis. 2d 540, 103 N.W.2d 560 (1960).
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tory negligence doctrine.3 5 That doctrine precluded a negligent plaintiff
from recovering anything from the defendant who had negligently in-
jured her. A court that was uncomfortable with a rule which barred a
careless plaintiff from recovering from a negligent defendant naturally
would be reluctant to extend that rule to other cases, especially inten-
tional tort cases in which the rule usually would place the entire loss on
the less culpable party."6 However, the availability of comparative
fault-be it pure comparative fault or modified comparative
fault-should ameliorate this concern.
Under a pure comparative fault regime, 7 a court need not worry
about the harshness of the contributory negligence rule because the
negligent plaintiff is no longer barred from recovering; her recovery
simply is reduced to reflect her share of the fault. Thus, the undue
harshness rationale for refusing to compare plaintiff's negligence with
defendant's intentional fault disappears.
On the other hand, harsh results could occur if modified compara-
tive fault were used in intentional tort cases; nevertheless, such results
are consistent with the philosophy of modified comparative fault and
are preferable to the results imposed by the present system. Under
modified comparative negligence, plaintiff's recovery is reduced as in
pure comparative negligence, but only until her fault reaches some
threshold amount, usually around fifty percent of the total fault., Once
plaintiff's fault reaches that threshold, her claim is barred. If this same
approach were used in intentional tort cases, a plaintiff whose fault was
under the threshold amount would obtain a reduced recovery, but a
plaintiff whose fault exceeded the threshold would be barred from re-
covery.3 9 Barring a plaintiff from all recovery even though she has
35. Jake Dear and Steven E. Zipperstein, Comparative Fault and Intentional Torts: Doctri-
nal Barriers and Policy Considerations, 24 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1, 9 (1984); See Godfrey v. Stein-
press, 128 Cal. App. 3d 154, 176 (1982); Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d 187, 194 (Wyo. 1979).
36. Generally, a defendant who has committed an intentional tort intended an injury similar
to the one that he caused and thus usually is more at fault morally than his victim, at least if the
victim's fault was mere carelessness.
37. Under pure comparative fault, plaintiff's recovery is reduced by the same proportion that
her fault bears to the total fault.
38. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence § 3.5 at 67 (cited in note 32). In two states, plaintiffs
are barred from recovery if their negligence is more than "slight." See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21,185
(1989); S.D. Cod. Laws Ann. § 20-9-2 (1987).
39. It is possible that a different type of modified comparative fault would be applied in
intentional tort cases. In jurisdictions in which modified comparative negligence is merely a step
toward adoption of pure comparative negligence, a different version of modified comparative fault
would be needed for intentional tort cases because in intentional tort cases the courts are going
from full recovery to partial recovery, instead of from no recovery to partial recovery. To reflect
that difference, the modified comparative fault system for intentional torts could permit the pre-
sent full recovery in all cases in which plaintiff's fault was below the threshold but allow only a
proportionate recovery when plaintiff's fault exceeded the threshold. Such a system would not
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shown that defendant committed an intentional tort is manifestly ineq-
uitable. Furthermore, in the intentional tort context (unlike in negli-
gence) disallowing recovery completely is so radical a departure from
the present system, which permits the negligent plaintiff to recover
fully, that the appearance of inequity is exacerbated. This treatment of
plaintiffs whose fault exceeds the threshold, however, comports with
one of the justifications most often offered for modified comparative
negligence-that a plaintiff should not recover from a person whose
fault is less than (or in some places, equal to) hers. In addition, when
plaintiff's fault exceeds defendant's, a rule that prevents plaintiff from
recovering from defendant is more equitable than the present approach,
which requires the less faulty defendant to pay fully the more faulty
plaintiff. Consequently, even though the use of modified comparative
fault in appropriate intentional tort cases would lead to harsh results
when plaintiff's fault is above the threshold, such results are in keeping
with the philosophy behind modified comparative fault and invariably
would be less inequitable than the present system of requiring defend-
ant to pay in full.
Thus, the courts' fear that recognizing plaintiffs' fault in inten-
tional tort cases would lead to unduly harsh results may be valid in
those few states that continue to insist that contributory negligence is a
complete defense. Courts in jurisdictions that bar plaintiffs from recov-
ery if their fault is more than slight also have reason to be reluctant to
use that version of modified comparative fault in intentional tort cases
because it could cause unduly harsh results in many cases while cor-
recting injustice in only a few. In all other jurisdictions, the use of com-
parative fault in intentional tort cases will not lead to unduly harsh
results; in fact, the results will be more equitable than those presently
reached.
B. Comparative Negligence Statutes Prohibit the Use of
Comparative Fault in Intentional Tort Cases
Because the field of contributory negligence was clearly governed
by common law, 40 its rules could be judicially modified. Many jurisdic-
change the results of intentional tort suits as significantly as would the usual modified system and
would avoid the harsh (in so far as plaintiff is concerned) results discussed in the text. It contra-
dicts, however, one of the theoretical justifications for modified comparative fault: that plaintiffs
whose fault is above the threshold are entitled to no recovery. Furthermore, it addresses the ineq-
uities of the present system only in those cases in which plaintiff's fault is above the threshold. It
seems unlikely that any jurisdiction would devise a comparative fault rule that undermines the
jurisdiction's rationale for using modified comparative negligence. The possibility that any court
would create such a system knowing that it would only partially correct the existing inequities is
even more remote.
40. See Li 532 P.2d at 1232.
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tions that have replaced contributory negligence, however, have
adopted comparative fault legislatively, and some of these statutes
speak in terms of comparative negligence. 41 A court might conclude that
the legislature, by enacting a comparative negligence statute, has indi-
cated that the comparison of fault is appropriate only in negligence
cases and that the court, consequently, does not have the power to ex-
tend the comparative fault doctrine to intentional tort cases.42 This
conclusion, however, is not required because the courts can judicially
create a comparative fault rule to be used in intentional tort cases. In
New Jersey, which has a comparative negligence statute," the courts
have created such a rule.44 Similarly, a number of courts have decided
that the existence of a comparative negligence statute does not prevent
them from using a variation of comparative fault in strict liability
cases.45 Even the Uniform Comparative Fault Act indicates that it is
proper for courts to apply comparative fault to situations such as inten-
tional torts, which are not specifically covered by the Act. 4" Accord-
ingly, the existence of a comparative negligence statute does not
preclude the courts from using comparative fault in intentional tort
cases.
C. Intent and Negligence Are Different in Kind and Thus Cannot
Be Compared
One of the more popular reasons offered to explain the prohibition
against using comparative fault in intentional tort cases is that defend-
ant's intent and plaintiff's negligence cannot be compared 4 because
they are different in kind.4' This argument fails for two reasons. First,
41. See, for example, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 7102 (Purdon 1983 and Supp. 1992); 12 Vt.
Stat. Ann. § 1036 (Equity Supp. 1992).
42. Some statutes, by specifying that they do not apply to actions based on intentional torts,
come closer to prohibiting the courts from extending their provisions to cover such torts. See, for
example, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.81 (West Supp. 1992). Even these statutes, however, do not prevent
the courts from applying comparative fault to intentional tort cases because they do not contain
provisions prohibiting courts from adopting comparative fault.
43. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:15-5.1 to 2A:15-5.3 (West 1987 and Supp. 1992).
44. Blazovic v. Andrich, 124 N.J. 90, 590 A.2d 222 (1991).
45. See, for example, Hao v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 738 P.2d 416 (Haw. 1987); Bell v. Jet
Wheel Blast, 462 So. 2d 166 (La. 1985). The Bell court noted that the statute does not prohibit it
"from applying comparative negligence to a claim previously insusceptible to the bar of contribu-
tory negligence." Id. at 170.
46. Although the Uniform Comparative Fault Act does not authorize the use of comparative
fault in intentional tort cases, the comments state that it does not prohibit the use of the doctrine
in those cases. Unif. Comp. Fault Act § 1, cmt. 12, reprinted in Schwartz, Comparative Negligence
364-65 (cited in note 32).
47. Florenzano v. Olson, 387 N.W.2d 168, 176 (Minn. 1986).
48. See, for example, Bell v. Mickelsen, 710 F.2d 611, 617 (10th Cir. 1983); Herbert v. First
Guaranty Bank, 493 So. 2d 150, 155 (La. Ct. App. 1986); Florenzano, 387 N.W.2d at 176 (Minn.
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although the conclusion that intent and negligence are different in kind
sounds appealing, significant doubt exists that they are.4" Second, even
if they are different in kind, that is not a sufficient reason to require
that one of two faulty people bear the entire loss.
1. Do Negligence and Intent Differ in Kind?
Although some courts, in refusing to consider plaintiffs' fault in in-
tentional tort cases, rely on the assertion that negligence and intent are
"different in kind," they rarely explain what makes the difference one
"in kind" rather than one "in degree""0 or state what differences be-
tween negligence and intent render those concepts different in kind.51
In fact, the basic premise of this justification for refusing to use com-
parative fault is undermined by the Second Restatement of Torts,
which implies that differences in degree may be differences in kind.52
Furthermore, assuming that two distinct types of differences exist, the
courts' conclusion that intent and negligence differ in kind rather than
in degree is rendered suspect by the fact that the courts sometimes con-
clude, when the issue arises in a different context, that these two con-
cepts differ only in degree.5 Some legal scholars seem to be confused as
1986); Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d 187, 193 (Wyo. 1979). See also Cage v. New York Central
R.R., 276 F. Supp. 778, 790 (W.D. Pa. 1967).
49. See text accompanying notes 50-79. As one eminent jurist, Circuit Judge Posner, has
said, "The spectrum is continuous between involuntary conduct at the one end and deliberate
action on full information at the other. There are no clean breaks marked 'involuntary,' 'unavoida-
ble,' 'negligent,' 'grossly negligent,' 'reckless,' 'deliberate.'" Ampat/Midwest, Inc. v. Illinois Tool
Works, Inc., 896 F.2d 1035, 1042 (7th Cir. 1990). Nevertheless, the court concluded that contribu-
tory negligence was not a defense to an intentional tort.
50. See, for example, cases cited in note 48.
51. The few courts that give any explanation for their "different in kind" conclusion often
exhibit some confusion about the state of mind required for an intentional tort. A Louisiana court
spoke of an intentional tortfeasor as one who "intended to inflict harm," Hebert, 493 So.2d at 155;
and a Kansas court described an intentional tortfeasor as one who "affirmatively wishes to injure";
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Baker, 98 P.2d 804, 807 (1908). But many intentional tortfeasors
intend no harm or injury. Similarly, the Supreme Court of Iowa stated that its rule against contri-
bution between intentional tortfeasors was based "upon moral turpitude and actual intent to in-
jure," neither of which is required for an intentional tort. Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa 800, 77 N.W.2d
23, 28 (1956).
52. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500 cmt. g (1963) states that the difference between
negligence and recklessness "is a difference in the degree of the risk, but this difference of degree is
so marked as to amount substantially to a difference in kind."
The Restatement's implication that no significant distinction can be drawn between differ-
ences in kind and differences in degree receives some support from Edward H. Levi who states
that often "matters of kind vanish into matters of degree." Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to
Legal Reasoning 9 (Univ. of Chicago, 1949).
53. See, for example, Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516, 524-525 (10th Cfr.
1979); Spivey v. Battaglia, 258 So. 2d 815, 817 (Fla. 1972).
The difficulty courts exhibit in distinguishing between intent and negligence is in itself some
indication that these concepts are not different in kind, for to amount to a difference in kind, the
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well. For example, Prosser and Keeton on Torts opines inconsistently
that in some cases the "distinction between intent and negligence obvi-
ously is a matter of degree" 54 and that the "aggravated form of negli-
gence, approaching intent.., differs from negligence not only in degree
but in kind .... ,5" Given these contrary conclusions and the paucity of
reasoning behind them, it is irresponsible to rely on the "different in
kind" rationale to deny important rights without fully exploring first
what is meant by differences in kind and degree and then the distinc-
tions between negligence and intent that supposedly render them dif-
ferent in kind.
In one of the few opinions containing any discussion of differences
in kind and degree, Justice Holmes stated that most differences are in
degree, not kind.5 6 He cited night and day as examples of things that
are different in degree; although night and day differ dramatically, they
are opposite poles of an "admitted antithesis" and thus differ in degree,
not in kind.57 Pursuant to that approach, things that can be measured
along a continuum differ in degree, while things that have no common
characteristic differ in kind.
In what respects do negligence and intent differ? According to gen-
erally accepted definitions, intent arises when the actor "desires to
cause [the] consequences of his act, or . . . believes that the conse-
quences are substantially certain to result from it." 8 Negligent conduct
"falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others
against unreasonable risk of harm. ' 59 Thus, intentionally tortious and
difference, at a minimum, must be detectable. No court that has concluded that the same conduct
can amount to both an intentional tort and negligence, see, for example, Mazzilli v. Doud, 485 So.
2d 477 (Fla. Ct. App. 1986); Ghassemieh v. Schafer, 52 Md. App. 31, 447 A.2d 84 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1982); Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d 187 (Wyo. 1979); or that has held that gross negli-
gence "may supply the element of intent," Lopez v. Surchia, 112 Cal. App. 2d 314, 317, 246 P.2d
111, 113 (1952), quoting 6 C.J.S. Assault & Battery § 10(3) (1975); that intent and recklessness are
"not necessarily opposed one to the other," Hackbart, 601 F.2d at 524; or that wantonness "finds
its equivalent, in point of responsibility, to willful or intentional wrong," Birmingham Southern R.
Co. v. Powell, 136 Ala. 232, 243, 33 So. 875, 878 (1903), can convincingly claim that intent and
negligence are so distinct as to be different in kind.
54. Keeton, et al., Torts § 8 at 36 (cited in note 4).
55. Id. § 65 at 462.
56. Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 631 (1906) (Holmes dissenting), overruled by Wil-
liams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 304 (1942).
57. Haddock, 201 U.S. at 632.
58. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A (1963).
59. Id. § 282. Somewhere between intention and negligence is recklessness, which involves an
intentional act or omission that the actor does or fails to do "knowing or having reason to know of
facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreason-
able risk of physical harm to another, but also that such risk is substantially greater than that
which is necessary to make his conduct negligent." Id. § 500. Depending upon the jurisdiction,
recklessness is either an aggravated form of negligence or an intermediary type of conduct, suppos-
edly different in kind from both negligence and intent. Compare, for example, Sorensen v. Allred,
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negligent conduct apparently differ on two bases. First, whereas the in-
tentional tortfeasor was at least "substantially certain" that particular
consequences would follow, 0 the negligent tortfeasor merely created an
unreasonable risk.6 1 Second, whereas the intentional tortfeasor subjec-
tively62 "intended" some consequences, the negligent tortfeasor failed
to meet an objective standard."3
No one doubts that differences, indeed meaningful differences, may
often exist between conduct that is substantially certain to cause a re-
sult and that which merely involves an unreasonable risk of the result.
The fact that these differences are meaningful, however, does not
render them differences in kind. The concepts of substantial certainty
and unreasonable risk describe the degree of certainty that the conduct
will cause a result. Thus, they exist on a continuum that stretches from
conduct creating no foreseeable risk of harm (usually nontortious con-
duct) through that creating an unreasonable risk of harm (negligent
conduct) and that creating a strong probability of harm (recklessness)
to that creating either a substantial certainty of harm or a desired harm
(intent). These constructs all measure the same concept-certainty of
harm-and thus shade into each other. To draw a line anywhere on this
continuum and declare that conduct on one side of the line differs in
kind from conduct on the other side of the line would be arbitrary and
is not supported by, much less required by, the differences between
these types of behavior.
Nor is the second supposed distinction between intentional torts
and negligence-the subjective, plaintiff-specific requirement of intent
versus the supposedly objective, reasonable person test of negli-
gence-sufficiently clear or significant to render the two concepts differ-
112 Cal. App. 3d 717, 169 Cal. Rptr. 441 (1980) and Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d
105 (1962), with Krivijanski v. Union: R.R., 357 Pa. Super. 196, 515 A.2d 933 (1986) and
Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d 187 (Wyo. 1979).
60. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A (1963).
61. Id. §§ 291, 500 (1963).
62. Some authorities contend that under the Second Restatement objective "intent" is suffi-
cient. David J. Jung and David I. Levine, Whence Knowledge Intent? Whither Knowledge Intent?,
20 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 551, 559-65 (1987). See also Leon Green, The Thrust of Tort Law, 64 W. Va.
L. Rev. 59, 63-4 (1961). To the extent that an objective test of intent is used, the linchpin of the
"different in kind" argument has been demolished.
Because most authorities contend that the test is subjective, this Article accepts that conclu-
sion and attempts to show that the difference between negligence and intent, as a practical matter,
is one of degree even under a subjective test of defendant's intent.
63. The authorities disagree as to whether an objective or subjective standard is used to de-
termine recklessness. Compare, for example, Roberts v. Brown, 384 So. 2d 1047 (Ala. 1980) and
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500 (1963), with Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 161 W. Va.
695, 246 S.E.2d 907 (1978) and Wolters v. Venhaus, 350 Ill. App. 322, 112 N.E.2d 747 (1953).
Compare by analogy Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 61-64 (1983) (Rehnquist dissenting).
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ent in kind. First, in examining whether a negligent defendant's state
of mind differs in kind from that of an intentional tortfeasor, the focus
should be on defendant's actual state of mind, not on whether the law
requires plaintiff to prove that defendant acted with a particular state
of mind. When that focus is brought to bear, the subjective-objective
distinction between intent and negligence largely disappears because,
even though the law does not require plaintiff in a negligence case to
prove that defendant subjectively realized that his conduct was unrea-
sonably dangerous, many negligence defendants knew that they were
creating unreasonable risks.6 5 In these cases no subjective-objective dis-
tinction exists between negligence defendants and intentional tort de-
fendants; both were subjectively aware of the risks created by their
conduct.
Second, an examination of cases shows that the requirement of
subjective intent is not distinct completely from the objective negli-
gence approach.66 Subjective intent can exist only in the mind of the
actor, yet no jury is required to accept the actor's self-serving testimony
as to his intent. Courts using the subjective standard of intentional
torts therefore permit the jury to "infer that the actor's state of mind
was the same as a reasonable person's state of mind would have
been. '6 7 Some states go even further, creating a presumption that the
actor "intend[ed] the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act."68 In
practice, the subjective standard of intentional torts thus approaches
the objective standard of negligence. Admittedly, a difference could ex-
ist in a particular case-the defendant could convince the jury that he
did not realize what a reasonable person would have realized and thus
avoid liability for an intentional tort-but that would be a highly un-
usual case. Typically the jury will find intent, despite defendant's
64. Interestingly, the Second Restatement does not focus on this distinction in the comments
that discuss the differences between intent, recklessness, and negligence. Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 282 cmts. d and e, and § 500 cmts. f and g (1963).
65. The entire deterrence rationale for imposing liability on negligent defendants is based on
the conclusion that potential defendants can and will decide what actions are unreasonably dan-
gerous. Some basis for concluding that this is possible clearly exists. For example, some studies
show that over half of the drivers who caused fatal automobile accidents "had blood alcohol level
concentrations far greater than those likely to be reached by most social drinkers." Harper, James,
and Gray, 3 Law of Torts at 91 (cited in note 4). Many of these drivers must have known that, by
drinking excessively and driving, they were creating unreasonable risks. Other defendants were
specifically warned of the risks they were creating. In Vaughn v. Menlove, 3 Bing (N.C.) 467, 132
Eng. Rep. 490 (Ct. Common Pleas 1837), defendant repeatedly was told that his hayrick was a fire
hazard, but said "he would chance it." Again it seems likely that defendant understood the danger,
but decided to continue his endangering conduct.
66. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. at 63-64 (Rehnquist dissenting).
67. Keeton, et al., Torts § 8 at 36 (cited in note 4).
68. Cal. Evidence Code § 665 (West 1966). Accord, Casualty Reciprocal Exchange v.
Thomas, 7 Kan. App. 2d 718, 647 P.2d 1361 (1982).
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protestations of ignorance, whenever a reasonable person would have
realized that his conduct would cause the proscribed invasion. Thus, as
a practical matter, the requirement that plaintiff prove that defendant
subjectively knew he would cause a result is not strictly enforced.
The supposed subjective-objective distinction between intent and
negligence is further eroded by the subjectivity that has crept into the
supposedly objective reasonable person test of negligence law. The con-
duct of a child is judged by that of a reasonable child of defendant's
age, intelligence, experience, skill, and understandingeg9-a somewhat
subjective standard. Although the conduct of an adult defendant is
judged by the reasonable person standard, the reasonable person takes
on the physical characteristics, ° superior knowledge, superior skill,7 1
and superior intelligence7 2 of the defendant. In a few jurisdictions de-
fendant's sudden, unforeseeable, severe insanity also is considered in
deciding if his conduct met the required standard.78 In such a case de-
fendant apparently is negligent only if he failed to act as a reasonable
person with defendant's insanity-obviously a rather subjective ap-
proach. Thus, in many instances the negligence standard is not com-
pletely objective.
Considering the subjectivity that has infiltrated the negligence
analysis and the extent to which the objective standard is used in inten-
tional tort cases, it is doubtful that the subjective-objective distinction
can support the conclusion that these torts always differ in kind. When
that blending of the subjective and the objective is considered in con-
junction with the fact that many negligence defendants knowingly cre-
ated unreasonable risks and thus would be liable even if a completely
subjective standard were used, it becomes clear that this insubstantial
subjective-objective distinction cannot sustain the conclusion that in-
tentional torts invariably differ in kind from negligence.7 4
There are other indications that negligence and intent are not dif-
ferent in kind. For example, with rare exceptions, a tort does not arise
69. Keeton, et al., Torts § 32 at 179-80 (cited in note 4).
70. Harper, James, and Gray, 3 Law of Torts at 421-23 (cited in note 4); Keeton, et al., Torts
§ 32 at 175 (cited in note 4).
71. Harper, James, and Gray, 3 Law of Torts at 420-21 (cited in note 4); Keeton, et al., Torts
§ 32 at 185 (cited in note 4).
72. Keeton, et al., Torts § 32 at 185 (cited in note 4).
73. See Breunig v. American Family Life Ins. Co., 45 Wis. 2d 536, 173 N.W.2d 619 (1970).
74. Evidence that some courts have implicitly recognized that this subjective-objective dis-
tinction is not the reason for their refusal to use comparative fault in intentional tort cases is their
refusal to compare plaintiff's negligence with defendant's willful or wanton conduct, even though
in these cases both parties' conduct is judged under an objective standard. See, for example, Da-
vies v. Butler, 95 Nev. 763, 602 P.2d 605 (1979) (no comparative fault when defendant's conduct
was willful or wanton; conduct is willful or wanton if the actor "knows, or should know" that his
intentional act "will very probably cause harm"); Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d at 193-94.
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if the plaintiff consented to defendant's conduct75 or if defendant rea-
sonably believed that plaintiff's conduct indicated consent. 6 Hence, in
some cases in which consent is the issue, an intentional tort will exist
only if defendant was negligent in deciding that plaintiff's conduct
evinced consent. Similarly, some privileges depend on what a reasona-
ble person in defendant's position would have believed. 77 Thus, a de-
fendant who asserts one of these privileges has committed an
intentional tort78 only if he fails to meet the objective reasonable person
standard. Once again, the existence of an intentional tort depends on
whether defendant's perceptions were those of a reasonable person.79 It
is hard to conclude that such a defendant's fault differs in kind (or even
in degree) from negligence.
2. Do Differences in Kind Mandate Different Results?
Even if intent and negligence do differ in kind, it is far from clear
that such a difference should prevent courts from using comparative
fault. Although that would be the case if it were impossible 0 to com-
pare the faulty conduct of plaintiff with that of defendant, in reality it
is no more difficult to compare negligent conduct to intentional conduct
than it is to compare two types of negligent conduct.81 Furthermore, in
strict liability cases, many courts and legislatures have decided that the
75. Harper, James, and Gray, 4 Law of Torts at 298 (cited in note 4); Keeton, et al., Torts §
18 at 112-13 (cited in note 4).
76. O'Brien v. Cunard S.S. Co., 154 Mass 272, 28 N.E. 266 (1891); Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 892 (1977).
77. See, for example, Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 88, 101, 119, 125 (1963).
78. Although there is some disagreement about whether the existence of a privilege negates
the tort or simply excuses it, the difference is of little significance here. I have used the Second
Restatement's conclusion that the existence of a privilege "prevents [defendant's] conduct from
being tortious .. " Id. Ch. 3, Scope Note (1963).
79. See, for example, id. § 892 comment b (1977).
80. Of course, policy reasons may justify the refusal to compare fault. However, that is not
the point being discussed here. Here the issue is whether the difference in kind between the two
concepts in and of itself requires that the parties' fault not be compared. Other supposed justifica-
tions for the refusal to use comparative fault are discussed in other subsections of Part III of this
Article.
81. In many negligence cases it is undeniably difficult to compare the faults of plaintiff and
defendant. Suppose a case in which plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident caused by the
combined negligence of the car manufacturer's negligent production of a defective car and plain-
tiff's substandard driving. Given the different types of conduct involved, jurors may have difficulty
determining how to divide the parties' fault.
It should be no more difficult to determine how to apportion fault in many intentional tort
cases. For example, suppose an intoxicated plaintiff attacked a similarly intoxicated defendant who
unreasonably misjudged the situation and used excessive force to repel plaintiffs attack. Defend-
ant's use of excessive force amounts to an intentional tort, but it seems easier to compare the fault
of this plaintiff and defendant than to compare the negligence of the car driver and the manufac-
turer discussed in the prior paragraph.
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benefits of comparative fault outweigh any conceptual difficulty in com-
paring the conduct of plaintiff and defendant.8 2 Any jurisdiction that,
in strict liability cases, requires juries to compare plaintiff's fault with
defendant's nonfault cannot contend seriously that any perceived diffi-
culty in comparing one type of fault (negligence) with another (intent)
justifies depriving the intentional tort defendant of the benefits of com-
parative fault.
One final indication that the "difference in kind" rationale may not
be the real basis for refusing to consider plaintiff's negligence in an in-
tentional tort situation is that courts in intentional tort cases often re-
fuse to consider plaintiff's intentional tortious conduct that was a cause
of her injury. Thus, a defendant whose spring gun shot a thief who was
trespassing on defendant's land is fully liable even though the thief's
intentionally tortious conduct was a substantial factor in causing her
injury.83 Similarly, a defendant who unreasonably used too much force
in defending himself from a battery is fully liable for the injury caused
by the excessive force, 4 and somewhat analogously, most jurisdictions
hold intentional tort defendants liable for full compensatory damages
even though plaintiff provoked defendant.85 Obviously, the reason for
refusing to consider plaintiff's fault in these types of cases cannot be
the alleged difference in kind between negligence and intent because all
of these parties acted intentionally.
Thus, the distinctions between negligent conduct and intentional
conduct do not render the two different in kind, and even if they did,
that difference would not justify denying intentional tort defendants
the benefits of comparative fault. Furthermore, the courts' refusal to
compare parties' intentionally tortious conduct indicates that their rea-
son for refusing to compare fault in intentional tort cases is not based
on the "different in kind" rationale.
82. See, for example, Alaska Stat. §§ 09.17.060, 09.17.900 (Supp. 1991); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 16-
64-122 (Supp. 1991); Lewis v. Timco, Inc., 716 F.2d 1425 (5th Cir. 1983) (admiralty); Aetna Casu-
alty & Surety Co. v. Jeppesen & Co., 642 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1981) (Nevada law); Murray v. Fair-
banks Morse, 610 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1979) (Virgin Island law); Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine
Constr. & Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1977) (admiralty); Daly v. Gen. Motors Corp., 20
Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162 (1978); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976);
Armstrong v. Cione, 69 Haw. 176, 738 P.2d 79 (1987); Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 228 Kan. 439,
618 P.2d 788 (1980); Sandford v. Chevrolet Div. of Gen. Motors, 292 Or. 590, 642 P.2d 624 (1982);
Fiske v. MacGregor, 464 A.2d 719 (R.I. 1983); Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414
(Tex. 1984); Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d 854 (W.Va. 1982).
83. See, for example, Katko v. Briney, 183 N.W.2d 657 (Iowa 1971).
84. Keeton, et al., Torts § 19 at 126 (cited in note 4).
85. Id.
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D. Plaintiff Is Entitled to Full Compensation
A variation on the different in kind argument, which has recently
been advanced, is that comparative fault should not be used in inten-
tional tort cases because intentional tort liability is not based on fault
at all, but on plaintiff's right to be compensated for certain intentional
invasions.8 6 While the latter part of this statement correctly states the
conclusion reached in cases in which liability is imposed, the argument
is based on the assumption that plaintiffs who presently would receive
full compensation invariably are entitled to full compensation. That po-
sition clearly begs the question.
E. Plaintiff Has No Duty to Act Reasonably to Avoid Harm
Some say that plaintiff's fault is irrelevant when defendant's tort
was intentional because plaintiff has no duty to act reasonably to avoid
being harmed by an intentional tort.8 7 Because a duty exists if the court
says it does,88 the question becomes: should there be a duty? This ques-
tion can be answered only by analyzing the reasons for and against im-
posing a duty through the use of comparative fault, an analysis with
which Parts II, III, IV, and V of this Article are concerned. Suffice it to
86. Michael B. Gallub, Assessing Culpability in the Law of Torts: A Call for Judicial Scru-
tiny in Comparing "Culpable Conduct" Under New York's CPLR 1411, 37 Syracuse L. Rev. 1079,
1112 (1987).
87. Charles Fisk Beach, Jr., A Treatise on the Law of Contributory Negligence § 65 at 104
(Baker, Voorhis , 3d ed. 1899). Because Beach's statement is based on the conclusion that a negli-
gent plaintiff should not be "deprived" of redress, the author might have reached a different con-
clusion had comparative fault been available. Accord, Steinmetz v. Kelly, 72 Ind. 442 (1880).
Compare Melendres v. Soales, 105 Mich. App. 73, 81-82, 306 N.W.2d 399, 403 (1981) (stating that
plaintiff's duty when the injury is caused "by design is insignificant, if existent at all"). A later
Michigan case concluded that a plaintiff has a significant duty not to permit himself willfully to be
injured by defendant's intentional tort. Dinger v. Dep't of Natural Resources, 147 Mich. App. 164,
383 N.W.2d 606 (1985).
Interestingly, the law already imposes on potential plaintiffs a duty of care to avoid being the
victims of intentional torts in a limited number of situations. For example, if plaintiff acted in a
way that reasonably caused defendant to conclude that plaintiff consented to defendant's conduct,
plaintiff impliedly consented, and no tort was committed. In this way, the law imposes on plaintiff
a duty to use reasonable care not to appear to consent to conduct to which she does not want to
consent. Plaintiff's failure to use reasonable care in this respect deprives her of a cause of action.
Similarly, the Restatement permits one private person to arrest another for a criminal offense if
the arrestee "knowingly causes the actor to believe that facts exist which would create in him a
privilege to arrest." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 119(e) (1963). For other similar privileges,
see id. §§ 88, 101. Plaintiff "knowingly" caused defendant's belief if she acted in a way that "a
reasonable man should realize [would create] a substantial probability of inducing the other.., to
believe" in the existence of facts that create the privilege to arrest her. Id. § 119 cmt. r. In such a
situation, the arrestee's extreme negligence can create a privilege to engage in conduct that would
otherwise constitute an intentional tort. Thus, the law has imposed on the arrestee a duty to use
some care to avoid being the victim of defendant's intentional tort. Plaintiff's extreme negligence
also appears to render invalid her claims based on deceit. See discussion in note 136.
88. Keeton, et al., Torts § 53 at 357-58 (cited in note 4).
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mention here that the problem of defining the plaintiff's duty to avoid
harm occurs in all cases involving contributory fault on the part of
plaintiffs9 and has not prevented the courts from finding plaintiffs to be
contributorily negligent and denying or reducing their recovery in negli-
gence cases. Furthermore, given the desirability of avoiding injuries
that can be avoided by the exercise of due care and the near certainty
that rules against comparative fault will not deter potential intentional
tortfeasors, 0 there is at least an argument that a duty to use due care
to avoid injury should be placed on both plaintiffs and defendants in
the hope that imposing that duty will deter carelessness and thereby
avoid injuries.
F. Plaintiff's Fault Cannot Be a Proximate Cause of Her Injury
Some have argued that plaintiff's fault is irrelevant when defend-
ant has committed an intentional tort because plaintiff's negligence
"can in no just sense be said to contribute to [her] injury.' ' 1 In many
cases, however, this is not true. For example, plaintiff's negligence may
have precipitated defendant's intentional tort-and foreseeably so. Re-
verting again to the example of the dog that was shot in the reasonable
belief that it was a wolf: if the dog had been released carelessly by a
third party, not its owner, little doubt exists that the owner could re-
cover from the third party for the death of the dog despite the interven-
ing intentional tort of the shooter.92 One of the risks that made it
unreasonable to release the dog was that it might be mistaken for a wolf
and shot. When one of the reasons why defendant's conduct is negligent
is the possibility that an intentional tort will be committed, the defend-
89. Keeton says that "[c]ontributory negligence involves no duty," id. § 65 at 453, while
others say that the plaintiff's duty is to use reasonable care to protect herself. See, for example,
Stephen v. City of Lincoln, 209 Neb. 792, 311 N.W.2d 889 (1981); Bartlett v. MacRae, 54 Or. App.
516, 635 P.2d 666 (1981); Glenn v. Brown, 28 Wash. App. 86, 622 P.2d 1279 (1980). Under neither
of these theories would the duty issue present a problem in an intentional tort situation. If no duty
is required, we need not worry about where to find one. If the required duty is merely to use
reasonable care to protect oneself from harm, then it exists and is breached anytime the plaintiff is
injured in part through her own carelessness. If the courts intend to confine plaintiff's duty to use
care to protect herself to cases in which the injury is caused negligently, they must offer some
reason for this limitation. Simply declaring that no duty exists is insufficient.
90. See text accompanying notes 106-09.
91. Beach, Contributory Negligence § 65 at 104 (cited in note 87). See generally A. M. Ho-
nor6, Causation and Remoteness of Damage, in Andr6 Tunc, XI/1 International Encyclopedia of
Comparative Law § 161 at 7110 (J.C.B. Mohr, 1983).
92. The proximate cause cases go much further than this hypothetical in that they permit
negligent defendants to be held liable for injuries that are purposefully inflicted, at least when it is
foreseeable that those injuries might be inflicted. Thus, the person who carelessly released the dog
might be liable even if the shooter killed the dog knowing it to be plaintiff's dog, as long as the
possibility that the dog would be so shot was a risk that a reasonable person would have foreseen.
See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 448 (1963). See also id. §§ 302B cmts. e and f, § 449 (1963).
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ant's negligence is a proximate cause of the injury even though the in-
jury is directly caused by the foreseeable intentional tort of another
person."
One person's negligence can be a proximate cause of an injury that
is directly caused by another person's intentional tort. The fact that the
negligent person is a plaintiff, rather than some third person, does not
break the causal connection or render the negligence any less
proximate. 4
G. The Need to Punish Defendant Precludes the Use of
Comparative Fault
One policy reason offered to support the refusal to reduce plain-
tiff's damages because of her contributory fault in intentional tort cases
is the need to punish the defendant.9 5 The argument is that the inten-
tional tortfeasor deserves to be punished for his wrong and thus should
not benefit from plaintiff's fault. This argument has several problems.
First, it is not clear that punishment is a particularly appropriate func-
tion for tort law; perhaps that function is more proper for criminal law
with its procedural safeguards.96 Second, assuming that punishment is
93. Hines v. Garrett, 131 Va. 125, 108 S.E. 690 (1921); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 449
(1963).
94. Honor6, Causation in Tunc, International Encyclopedia § 161 at 7110 (cited in note 91).
95. See, for example, Harper, James, and Gray, 4 Law of Torts § 22.5 at 294 (cited in note 4);
Dear and Zipperstein, 24 Santa Clara L. Rev. at 18-19 (cited in note 35). Compare Davies v. But-
ler, 95 Nev. 763, 764-73, 602 P.2d 605, 611 (1979); Draney v. Bachman, 138 N.J. Super. 503, 514,
351 A.2d 409, 415 (1976).
The tendency of some courts to find ways to require liability insurers to pay for damages
caused by intentional torts is some indication that they do not find this rationale to be particularly
important. See, for example, Vanguard Ins. Co. v. Cantrell, 18 Ariz. App. 486, 503 P.2d 962 (1972)
(defendant's liability insurance covered plaintiff's claim when defendant, in an attempt to escape
from a robbery he had just perpetrated, shot in plaintiff's direction to scare him, but without
intent to injure him; the bullet hit plaintiff, causing serious damage); Smith v. Moran, 61111. App.
2d 157, 209 N.E.2d 18 (1965) (homeowner's insurance covers gunshot injuries inflicted on plaintiff
by the insured when the insured shot at a third person and the bullet hit plaintiff).
96. See, for example, Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1873) ("Is not punishment out of
place, irregular, anomalous, exceptional, unjust, unscientific, not to say absurd and ridiculous,
when classed among civil remedies?"); Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45, 53, 25 P.
1072, 1074 (1891) ("Surely the public can have no interest in exacting the pound of flesh"). Justice
Brennan has said that punitive damages in defamation cases are "'wholly irrelevant' to further-
ance of any valid state interest." Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S.
749, 794 (1985) (Brennan dissenting) (emphasis added), citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 350 (1974). Further doubt about the propriety of punishment as an objective of tort law
is demonstrated by the fact that some states that permit punitive damages specify that punish-
ment is not a proper function of these damages. See, for example, Foss v. Maine Turnpike Auth.,
309 A.2d 339, 345 (Me. 1973); Birkenshaw v. City of Detroit, 110 Mich. App. 500, 511, 313 N.W.2d
334, 339 (1981).
For a discussion of the reasons against punishing in civil cases, see Duffy, Punitive Damages:
A Doctrine Which Should Be Abolished, in The Case Against Punitive Damages (1969). See also
1993]
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sometimes a desirable objective for a tort action, it is inappropriate in
many intentional tort cases, 97 making this rationale overbroad at best.
Third, plaintiffs in some intentional tort cases seem quite deserving of
punishment,98 yet the prohibition against comparative fault assures
them full compensation. As a result, such plaintiffs not only go unpun-
ished, but also are absolved of all responsibility for their reprehensible
behavior.9 9 Can society's need to punish all intentional tort defendants
be so great that it justifies adopting a rule that permits plaintiffs to act
reprehensibly with impunity? Fourth, it cannot be assumed that paying
a proportionate share of the damages is never sufficient punishment for
an intentional tortfeasor, yet the punishment rationale for prohibiting
comparative fault is based on that assumption. Fifth, and probably
most important, when punishment is appropriate, it usually can be
achieved through the imposition of punitive damages.100 Consequently,
those jurisdictions that want to punish certain intentional tortfeasors in
a civil proceeding can do so through punitive damage awards; no need
exists for them to distort proper compensatory damage awards to ob-
tain punishment.
H. The Need to Deter Substandard Conduct Makes Comparative
Fault Undesirable
Closely related to the punishment rationale is the argument that
refusing to use comparative fault deters intentional tortfeasors,' 10
which, the argument continues, is a sufficient goal to justify imposing
inequitable damage awards. Certainly deterrence of potential inten-
tional tortfeasors is an accepted goal of tort law, although the number
of cases permitting insurance to cover losses inflicted by intentional
A.B.A. Special Committee on the Tort Liability System, Towards a Jurisprudence of Injury: The
Continuing Creation of a System of Substantive Justice in American Tort Law, 4-171 to 4-175
(1984). But see Symposium: Punitive Damages, 40 Ala. L. Rev. 687 (1989).
97. There is simply no reason to punish many intentional tortfeasors including, for example,
those defendants like the hunter in Ranson who merely made reasonable mistakes.
98. Imagine, for example, the plaintiff who knowingly taunts the retarded or insane defend-
ant until that person slaps plaintiff.
99. Plaintiff's conduct may result in a denial of punitive damages, but in most jurisdictions
it is irrelevant to her recovery of compensatory damages. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 921
(1977).
100. All states except Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and Washington
allow some punitive damages. James D. Ghiardi and John J. Kircher, 1 Punitive Damages Law
and Practice §§ 4.02 - 4.12 (Callaghan, 1991). Michigan and Connecticut seem to limit punitives to
damages needed to compensate, thus severely limiting their punitive nature. Id. All these states
have determined that punishment is not a proper function for tort law, and thus they should not
cite punishment as a justification for prohibiting comparative fault.
101. Glanville L. Williams, Joint Torts and Contributory Negligence § 55 at 198 (Stevens &
Sons, 1951). See, for example, Draney v. Bachman, 138 N.J. Super. 503, 514, 351 A.2d 409, 415
(1976). See generally, McNichols, 37 Okla. L. Rev. at 679-80 (cited in note 19).
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tortfeasors'02 indicates that many courts view the deterrence function
as either relatively unimportant or unattainable through the imposition
of damage awards. I assume that deterrence remains an important aim
of the law of intentional torts. This does not mean, however, that the
deterrence goal justifies the refusal to use comparative fault.
First, it may be unfair to try to deter future intentional tortfeasors
by excessively punishing those intentional tortfeasors who are sued. In
the criminal context, "[t]here is a limit to which a criminal can be used
to benefit society at large.' 10 3 A similar limit may exist when defend-
ant's conduct is merely tortious,' °4 and a court that assesses damages
without considering plaintiff's fault may exceed that limit. 0 5
Second, there is serious reason to doubt that the use of compara-
tive fault would undermine any deterrence achieved by the present
damage rules. Some question exists about the effectiveness of legal pen-
alties as deterrents. Some researchers have found that punishment
probably is not an effective deterrent of criminal behavior, 06 and others
have concluded that the perceived severity of the punishment has little
deterrent effect. 0 7 For example, one study of 145 convicted murderers
102. See, for example, Vanguard Ins. Co. v. Cantrell, 118 Ariz. App. 486, 503 P.2d 962 (1972)
(homeowner's insurance covers injuries inflicted by thief who intentionally shot in plaintiff's direc-
tion, hoping to cause plaintiff to duck, but not intending to injure him); Sabri v. State Farm Fire
& Casualty Co., 488 So.2d 362 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (insured's insurance covers injuries sustained by
plaintiff who was shot by the insured because he thought she was a criminal breaking into his
home; plaintiff was insured's daughter, and had he realized that, he would not have shot); Putman
v. Zeluff, 372 Mich. 553, 127 N.W.2d 374 (1964) (insured's insurance covered injuries inflicted by
insured when he shot and killed a dog that he thought might attack and kill him); Lumbermens
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Blackburn, 477 P.2d 62 (Okla. 1970) (homeowner's insurance covers injuries
inflicted when insured threw debris at plaintiff without intending to injure him); Spengler v. State
Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 568 So. 2d 1293 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (when insured shot plain-
tiff in erroneous belief that she was a burglar, homeowner's insurance covered plaintiff's injuries).
103. Ezzat Abdel Fattah, Deterrence: A Review of the Literature, in Law Reform Commis-
sion of Canada, Fear of Punishment 1, 15 (William S. Hein & Co., 1975). See Franklin E. Zimring
and Gordon J. Hawkins, Deterrence: The Legal Threat to Criminal Control 35-42 (Chicago, 1973).
For example, even if it could be shown that chopping off the hands of thieves would decrease
dramatically the number of thefts, it is unlikely that our society would endorse such treatment.
The same might be said of less drastic punishments, for example, imposing long prison terms for
parking violations.
104. See Dan B. Dobbs, Ending Punishment in "Punitive" Damages: Deterrence-Measured
Remedies, 40 Ala. L. Rev. 831, 854-55 (1989).
105. "In any society committed in the least to principles of freedom, to the dignity of its
individual citizens, and to 'due' process of the law, the community cannot be allowed to punish a
citizen solely to promote the public good." David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Punitive
Damages, 40 Ala. L. Rev. 705, 725 (1989).
106. Eysenck, Crime and Personality 147-48 (1964), quoted in Zimring and Hawkins, Deter-
rence at 98 (cited in note 103); Hart, Punishment and Responsibility 1 (1968), quoted in Zimring
and Hawkins, Deterrence at 76 (cited in note 103); Wolf Middendorff, The Effectiveness of Pun-
ishment 53-67 (Rothman, 1968).
107. Raymond Paternoster, et al., Perceived Risk and Social Control: Do Sanctions Really
Deter?, 17 Law and Soc'y Rev. 457 (1983). Accord, Fattah, Deterrence, in Fear of Punishment at
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showed that not one of them thought of the possibility of being sen-
tenced to death before committing the crime.108 While studies of crimi-
nal behavior patterns may not always apply to merely tortious behavior,
they at least cast some doubt upon the efficacy of legal penalties in de-
terring antisocial behavior.
Further, even assuming that legal penalties, such as a prohibition
against the use of comparative fault, can deter people from engaging in
intentionally tortious behavior, two conditions must be met before
these penalties could possibly have that effect: the potential tortfeasor
must be aware of the penalty, and he must guide his conduct in appre-
hension of it. It is unlikely that many potential tortfeasors know about
the legal rules governing the use of comparative fault. Studies indicate
that most people know very little about what penalties can be imposed
for different crimes.10 9 Criminal penalty rules receive some publicity,
particularly among those who have been convicted, yet even members
of that group are, to a large extent, unaware of them. Given this lack of
knowledge of criminal law penalties even by those most likely to be af-
fected by them, the conclusion is inescapable that comparative fault
rules, which receive virtually no publicity, are seldom known by poten-
tial tortfeasors.
Further, even assuming that many potential intentional tortfeasors
know the rule governing comparative fault in the appropriate jurisdic-
tion, common sense indicates that they would seldom change their con-
duct because of that rule. The rule against the use of comparative fault
could deter only those who find the specter of paying the full amount of
damages unacceptable but nevertheless would accept the risk of paying
less than full damages. Given the uncertainty that a jury will find plain-
tiff at fault and the possibility that, if it does, the reduction in damages
might be insignificant, it is difficult to imagine that a defendant, who is
cautious and calculating enough to be deterred by the possibility of
having to pay full damages, will alter his behavior because of these
speculative possibilities. This is particularly true in the vast majority of
torts in which it is impossible for the tortfeasor to know either what
injury he will cause or, even if he could know that, what monetary value
a jury would attach to that particular harm. It is hard to believe that
43 (cited in note 103). See also Zimring and Hawkins, Deterrence at 200 (cited in note 103).
108. David C. Leven, Vengeance Remains Sole Reason to Support the Death Penalty, N.Y.
Times A18 (July 3, 1991).
109. Fattah, Deterrence, in Fear of Punishment at 43, 83 (cited in note 103); Zimring and
Hawkins, Deterrence at 145-46 (cited in note 103). For example, one study showed the following:
Only 17% of the general public and 50% of adult prisoners could select the correct potential pen-
alties for forgery; 35% of the general public and 59% of the adult prisoners could choose the
potential penalties for assault; and 8% of the general public and 85% of the adult prisoners could
choose the right penalties for first-degree robbery. Zimring and Hawkins, Deterrence at 145-46.
[Vol. 46:121
COMPARATIVE FAULT
anyone who would be deterred by the possibility of liability for an un-
certain amount of damages would find the risk of liability acceptable
because of a chance that this uncertain amount might be decreased by
some other even more uncertain amount.
Finally, even assuming that comparative fault rules do deter poten-
tial intentional tortfeasors, that cannot end the deterrence inquiry, for
the same rules also may affect plaintiffs' behavior. The unavailability of
comparative fault might encourage a plaintiff to act in a faulty manner,
confident that she will recover fully despite her fault. If plaintiff's be-
havior is faulty, which is the only situation in which comparative fault
would be used, there is good reason to want to deter it. Consequently,
even if potential intentional tort defendants can be deterred by holding
them fully liable, the value of that deterrence must be decreased by the
value of the deterrence of careless plaintiffs that is lost by that rule.
Thus, in view of the extreme improbability that the rule against the use
of comparative fault will be a deciding factor in a defendant's decision
to engage in intentionally tortious behavior and the possibility that this
rule may encourage plaintiffs to engage in faulty behavior, deterrence is
not a rational reason for the rule prohibiting the use of comparative
fault in intentional tort cases.
I. Victim Compensation Militates Against the Use of Comparative
Fault
Victim compensation is said to be an appropriate goal of the tort
system, 10 and prohibiting the use of comparative fault in intentional
tort cases could be viewed as a way to further that goal: intentional tort
plaintiffs receive full compensation for their injuries regardless of their
fault.
First, it should be noted that this argument has not carried the day
in the area of negligence where plaintiffs are rarely permitted full recov-
ery if they were at fault in causing their injury. In most jurisdictions,
the same is true of strict liability plaintiffs. No reason exists to suppose
that intentional tort plaintiffs are more in need of compensation than
are negligence or strict liability plaintiffs.
Second, this argument overlooks a significant problem: the tort sys-
tem cannot eliminate plaintiff's loss; at most the system can reallocate
the loss by requiring defendant to pay plaintiff. Plaintiff is thereby
compensated, but only by imposing a larger loss"' on defendant. It
110. See John G. Fleming, Is There a Future for Tort?, 44 La. L. Rev. 1193, 1203 (1984);
McNichols, 37 Okla. L. Rev. at 684-85 (cited in note 19).
111. When the costs of litigation are considered, it seems that the loss imposed on defendant
is likely to be significantly more than that originally imposed on plaintiff because the defendant, in
19931
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makes no sense to try to compensate one victim11"2 by creating another
victim whose loss exceeds that initially imposed. The attraction of hold-
ing defendant liable is not so much compensation as loss spreading. Al-
though loss spreading is achieved by imposing liability on negligence
and strict liability defendants, as previously discussed," 3 that is not
true in intentional tort cases. On the contrary, in these cases compara-
tive fault, by dividing the loss, may well serve the loss spreading goal
better than the present approach.
Once it is acknowledged that courts cannot eradicate the loss
caused by a tort, but at most reallocate it, the appeal of victim compen-
sation as a justification for imposing liability dissipates. To the extent
that the real goal of victim compensation is loss spreading, that goal is
better served in intentional tort cases by using comparative fault.
IV. WHEN COMPARATIVE FAULT SHOULD BE USED IN INTENTIONAL
TORT CASES
Given the broad appeal of comparative fault and the weakness of
the reasons offered for refusing to use it in intentional tort cases, one is
tempted to conclude that the present rule should be replaced by the
rule used in most other tort cases: plaintiff's recovery should be de-
creased by the same proportion that plaintiff's fault bears to the total
fault." 4 The chance that such a rule would cause meaningful injustice
to the parties is slight because in cases of real malfeasance jurors un-
doubtedly would be unimpressed with claims by nefarious defendants
that plaintiffs should have done more to prevent defendants from caus-
ing them injury. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to decide if there are
intentional tort cases in which comparative fault should not be used. An
overly broad mandate to compare fault might lead some juries to reach
unwarranted results, a consequence that obviously should be avoided if
at all possible. Furthermore, the use of comparative fault will inject new
issues into some trials, perhaps hindering a prompt resolution of those
and other cases," 5 another untoward result. Finally, despite the weak-
ness of the arguments offered against the use of comparative fault, the
mind rebels against its use in some intentional tort cases. Picture, for
example, a claim by a thief that his liability for stolen items should be
addition to paying for plaintiff's injury, has incurred legal expenses.
112. In actuality, plaintiff probably has not been fully compensated because she too must
pay her lawyer.
113. See text accompanying notes 31-32.
114. New Jersey recently adopted a similar approach. Blazovic v. Andrich, 129 N.J. 90, 590
A.2d 222 (1991)..
115. The administrative burdens likely to accompany the use of comparative fault in inten-
tional tort cases are more fully discussed in the text accompanying notes 163-89.
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reduced because his victim's carelessness made it easy for him to steal.
We instinctively know that the law should not recognize such a claim.
The thief's conduct should prevent him from asserting that his liability
should be reduced to reflect plaintiff's fault,116 but why? Unless a
method is devised to distinguish this type of claim from somewhat simi-
lar claims by other intentional tort defendants, the entire argument for
using comparative fault seems suspect.
In examining which intentional tort defendants should be pre-
vented from using plaintiff's fault to mitigate damages, it is helpful to
categorize defendants according to their conduct. Defendants who are
liable for intentional torts can be divided into the following four catego-
ries: (1) Defendants who did not intend to inflict the injury of which
plaintiffs complain or any other harm that, under the facts as defend-
ants believed them to be, would have been prohibited (e.g., defendant
shot a wolf-like dog, believing it to be a wolf); (2) Defendants who in-
tended to inflict the harm of which plaintiffs complain but who believed
that facts existed which rendered the conduct nontortious (e.g., defend-
ant shot the dog, knowing it was a dog but believing that he had to
shoot it to defend himself); (3) Defendants who did not intend to inflict
the harm complained of but who did intend to inflict a different type of
harm, aware of facts under which they had no right to do so (e.g., de-
fendant intentionally shot at a dog, realizing it was a nonthreatening
dog, but the bullet struck plaintiff); (4) Defendants who intended the
harms of which plaintiffs complain, aware of facts depriving them of
any privilege to inflict those harms (e.g., defendant shot plaintiff's dog
for fun). These situations will be considered in order.
A. Defendant Did Not Intend to Inflict the Injury of Which
Plaintiff Complains or Any Other Harm That, Under the Facts as
Defendant Believed Them to Be, Would Have Been Prohibited
1. When Defendant's Belief Was Reasonable (E.g., Defendant Shot a
Wolf-Like Dog Reasonably Believing It to Be a Wolf)
Cases in the first subcategory are similar in some respects to strict
liability cases: defendant is held liable even though he was not morally
at fault in causing plaintiff's harm and did not violate even the objec-
tive standard of negligence. A defendant in this type of case made a
reasonable mistake, and the justification for holding him liable is that
"as between two parties equally free from moral blame, [the loss should
116. A similar explanation supports the avoidable consequences rule: plaintiff who fails to
use reasonable means to avoid or minimize the damages caused by a tort is "under a 'disability' to
recover for [the] avoidable loss." Charles T. McCormick, Handbook on the Law of Damages § 33
at 128 (West, 1935).
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be on] the one who made the mistake.1 17 Given the justification, plain-
tiff's carelessness obviously should not be ignored, for if plaintiff was
careless, the court is not faced with "two parties equally free from
moral blame." A strong argument can be made that in such a case,
plaintiff, the only blameworthy party, should bear the entire loss. As-
suming that defendant is to be held liable, there is no reason why this
morally innocent defendant should be treated more harshly than a neg-
ligent defendant. Clearly the reason for holding defendant liable would
not be undermined by holding plaintiff partially responsible. The per-
son who made a reasonable mistake (the shooter who reasonably be-
lieved he was shooting a wolf, for example) may have committed an
intentional tort, but as discussed in Parts II and III of this Article, that
in itself is no reason to ignore plaintiff's fault in causing the damage.
Nothing about such a defendant's conduct should disable him from us-
ing plaintiff's fault to decrease the amount of plaintiff's judgment.11
Comparative fault 1 9 should be used in these cases.
2. When Defendant's Belief Was Unreasonable (E.g., Defendant
Shot a Dog Believing It to Be a Wolf, but a Reasonable Person
Would Have Realized It Was a Dog)
The position of defendants in this category closely resembles that
of negligence defendants-both have been careless, and that careless-
ness has led to an unintended harm. The difference is that the inten-
tional tort defendant intended the physical result of his conduct, but
because of his carelessness, did not apprehend that the result would be
objectionable, while the negligence defendant did not intend the result
at, all, although he may well have realized that the result was both likely
117. Keeton, et al., Torts § 17 at 110 (cited in note 4).
118. In one special situation, the unusual remedy provided for the tort makes it desirable to
ignore plaintiff's fault. When plaintiff successfully sues for conversion, defendant obtains good title
to the converted item. Consequently, a defendant permitted to use comparative fault could obtain
good title even though the judgment in the conversion suit was for less than the value of the
converted item. This raises the possibility that defendant could profit from his tort, a result that
should not be permitted. If, however, in addition to paying the judgment in the conversion suit,
defendant previously had paid for the item so that his total payments equal or exceed the value of
the item, he would not profit from the tort even if comparative fault were used. For example, a
defendant who, in good faith, paid $90 for a stolen item that was worth $100, would not make any
profit from the tort as long as the judgment in the conversion suit required him to pay at least $10.
Consequently, he should be permitted to use comparative fault as long as he is held liable for at
least $10. On the other hand, a defendant who took plaintiff's goods reasonably believing they were
his own, should not be allowed to use plaintiff's fault to reduce his liability if doing so would
permit him to profit from the conversion.
119. The judge in these cases should not instruct the jury to allocate the loss based on the
relative fault of the parties, which might result in the imposition of the entire loss on plaintiff.
Instead the judge should instruct the jury to allocate the loss equitably. Such instructions might
well mirror those given when comparative fault is used in strict liability cases.
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and highly objectionable. In terms of moral fault, the negligent defend-
ant often will be considerably more blameworthy than this intentional
tort defendant. Nothing about this intentional tort defendant's behav-
ior makes it undesirable to hold the plaintiff partially responsible for
the injury caused in part by her negligence. Because the essence of both
parties' fault is carelessness, it is equitable to consider the carelessness
of both in apportioning the loss.
B. Defendant Intended the Harm of Which Plaintiff Complains,
but Believed that Facts Existed Which Rendered the Conduct Non-
Tortious (E.g., Defendant Shot a Dog Knowing It Was a Dog, but
Believing He Had to Shoot It to Defend Himself)
Defendants in this category of cases at first appear to be on sub-
stantially different ground than defendants in the first category, for the
second type of defendant actually intended the harm for which plaintiff
seeks recompense. Nevertheless, these defendants claim that they
should be treated with some compassion because they thought facts ex-
isted that justified their acts. At present, a defendant in this position
claims a privilege and either is relieved of all liability or is held fully
accountable. In instances in which defendant is held liable120 and plain-
tiff's carelessness contributed to the injury, why should that careless-
ness be ignored?
The strongest case for ignoring plaintiff's fault arises when defend-
ant was morally at fault in deciding that facts existed which gave him a
right to act as he did. Munoz v. Olin'21 is such a case. In Munoz, arson
investigators intentionally shot a person suspected of being a fleeing ar-
sonist. The investigators claimed a privilege, but the jury determined
that the investigators had not acted reasonably in shooting and thus
were not privileged. The jury also concluded that the suspect had been
120. Arguments similar to those discussed in the text might be made by plaintiffs in cases in
which defendants are not held liable even though they acted under a mistake. For example, a
person who reasonably believes he is being attacked has a privilege to defend himself regardless of
the truth of his belief. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 63 (1963). In Crabtree v. Dawson, 119 Ky.
148, 83 S.W. 557 (1904), defendant struck plaintiff, incorrectly thinking that plaintiff was someone
he had a privilege to hit in self-defense. Because defendant's belief was reasonable, even though
incorrect, he was privileged, and the totally innocent plaintiff was required to bear the entire loss.
This result is explained on the ground that the law cannot and should not discourage self-defense.
Keeton, et al., Torts § 19 at 125 (cited in note 4). Assuming that those reasons justify this result
when the choice is to impose full liability or no liability, they may be insufficient now that it is
possible to apportion losses. In instances like this, in which the law grants a privilege to a person
who made an error, the determination whether comparative responsibility should be used requires
a thorough consideration of the values being advanced by the privilege-a consideration that is
beyond the scope of this Article.
121. 76 Cal. App. 3d 85 (1977), vacated on other grounds, 24 Cal. 3d 629, 596 P.2d 1143
(1979).
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negligent, apparently by fleeing the alley where a fire had just started,
and that his negligence contributed to his death. They divided the fault
among the parties, assigning sixty-five percent to defendants and
thirty-five percent to decedent. The appellate court held that the dece-
dent's fault could not properly be considered because the tort was in-
tentional. Although the tort was intentional, it arose from the
investigators' negligence: had their decision to shoot been reasonable,
there would have been no liability. Nothing distinguishes the moral
fault of these defendants from that of the typical negligence defendant.
The death resulted from the combined carelessness of decedent and de-
fendants, and comparative fault should have been used.
Defendant's argument for comparative fault in cases involving a
failed claim of privilege is even stronger when defendant was not mor-
ally at fault in concluding that his conduct was justified. For example,
some privileges do not exist if defendant's belief that his actions were
justified was based on a mistake, even a reasonable mistake, unless the
mistake was "knowingly" caused by plaintiff.122 A person "knowingly"
causes a mistake if she either realizes or as a reasonable person should
realize that her conduct "creates a substantial probability" of causing
the mistaken belief. 123 Under this standard, even if a reasonable person
in plaintiff's position would have realized that her conduct created an
unreasonable risk (but not a substantial probability) of causing defend-
ant's erroneous belief, defendant is not privileged. Thus, a plaintiff who
negligently caused defendant to form his reasonable but mistaken belief
would be permitted to recover fully for her losses. 124 As a result, a mor-
ally innocent, albeit mistaken, defendant is required to pay a careless
plaintiff, whose fault is ignored. Such a defendant, who reasonably be-
lieved that his acts were socially desirable, should be entitled to at least
the same care owed to a negligent defendant. Comparative fault 125
should be used.
122. See, for example, Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 88, 101, 119 (1963).
123. Id. § 119 cmt. r (1963).
124. An example of this unusual situation might be helpful. Suppose defendant saw plaintiff
fighting with another person. Defendant yelled "stop," at which point plaintiff fled. Reasonably
believing this fight to have been mutual combat (a breach of the peace), defendant arrested plain-
tiff. In fact, plaintiff had been defending herself, and the arrest was improper unless plaintiff real-
ized or should have realized that her conduct created a substantial probability of causing
defendant to believe that she had committed a breach of the peace. If plaintiff's conduct was
sufficient to reach the "substantial probability" level, defendant would not be liable at all. How-
ever, if plaintiff's conduct (in fighting and fleeing) merely created an unreasonable risk that de-
fendant would conclude that plaintiff had breached the peace, defendant would be fully liable. See
id. § 119.
125. Comparative responsibility might better describe the method of allocating damages here
because defendant's fault-making a reasonable mistake for which the law holds him lia-
ble-involves no opprobrium.
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C. Defendant Did Not Intend to Inflict the Injury About Which
Plaintiff Complains, but Did Intend to Inflict a Different Injury,
Aware of Facts Under Which He Had No Right to Do So (E.g.,
Defendant Intentionally Shot at a Dog, Realizing It Was a
Nonthreatening Dog, but the Bullet Struck Plaintiff)
Cases in this category present the most serious problems. Here de-
fendant intended to cause one type of injury, knowing that he had no
justification for doing so, but the injury being complained about is ei-
ther a different, unintended injury or the intended type of injury, in-
flicted on a different person. Such a defendant often is found to have
committed an intentional tort and is held liable for the unintended in-
juries under either the liberal damage rules applicable to intentional
tort suits'26 or the doctrine of transferred intent.12 7 If plaintiff's care-
lessness was also a cause of the unintended injury, should defendant's
liability for that injury be decreased?
Defendant's argument for comparative fault in this type of case is
not without basis. Although his conduct was intentionally tortious, it
merely created a risk of the unintended injury of which plaintiff com-
plains and thus, as to that injury, was at most negligent. 2 8 Arguably, if
defendant's conduct with respect to the injury was at most negligent, he
should be treated like other negligent defendants and be permitted to
use comparative fault to impose part of the unintended loss on the
plaintiff, whose misconduct was also a cause of that loss. Plaintiff's only
response is that, because defendant tried to cause one type of harm, he
should be prevented from contending that his liability for the unin-
tended harm should be reduced to reflect plaintiff's fault. But why?
Why should the fact that defendant intended some harm-perhaps a
minor harm-mean that he has forfeited his right to demand that
plaintiff take reasonable care to avoid a different, unintended harm?
The fact that defendant intended to commit an intentional tort know-
ing that he had no right to do so should not render him a pariah.'29
126. See, for example, Cleveland Park Club v. Perry, 165 A.2d 485 (D.C. 1960); Rogers v.
Kent Board of County Road Comm'rs, 319 Mich. 661, 30 N.W.2d 358 (1947); Vosburg v. Putney,
80 Wis. 523, 50 N.W. 403 (1891).
127. See, for example, Talmage v. Smith, 101 Mich. 370, 59 N.W. 656 (1894).
128. This defendant's position is similar to that of the defendant in a public nuisance case
who knowingly created a dangerous condition that, in turn, created a risk of harm. Neither that
defendant nor the defendant discussed in the text intended the harm that occurred. In the nui-
sance case, a number of courts have concluded that plaintiff's fault should be considered in assess-
ing damages if it was a proximate cause of the harm despite the fact that the nuisance was
intentional. See, for example, Timmons v. Reed, 569 P.2d 112 (Wyo. 1977).
129. This conclusion is in keeping with the modern view that possessors of land owe a duty
of care to trespassers. See, for example, Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561 (1968);
Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 352 N.E.2d 868 (1976). The trespasser usually is invading the
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There is one group of cases in which these defendants' arguments
for comparative fault should be rejected. A defendant who took advan-
tage of a plaintiff's carelessness should not be able to rely on that same
carelessness to reduce his liability. Such a defendant's claim is that,
even though he exploited plaintiff's lack of care, he should be able to
complain about that lack'of care. Such a claim must be rejected. Having
used plaintiff's fault to advance his own objectives, defendant has for-
feited any right to complain about that fault. Thus, if a defendant who
robbed plaintiff at 2 a.m. on the subway tried to reduce his liability for
unintended injuries by claiming that plaintiff was negligent in being on
the subway at that time, his claim would get short shrift. By taking
advantage of plaintiff's alleged carelessness, defendant has lost any
right to use that carelessness to decrease his liability.
When defendant did not take advantage of plaintiff's carelessness,
defendant's argument for the use of comparative fault is strong. For
example, in Rogers v. Kent Board of County Road Commissioners,3 0
defendant failed to remove an anchor post from decedent's land when
defendant's license to have the post there expired. Decedent's mowing
machine hit the post, throwing decedent to the ground. As a result of
the injuries sustained, decedent died. Suppose defendant had intention-
ally left the post on the land because it was very hard to remove. Fur-
ther suppose that the post was visible and that decedent failed to see it
only because he was not paying proper attention. The law would hold
defendant liable for the death because it resulted from his trespass, but
why should decedent's negligence go unnoticed? As to this injury, de-
fendant was merely careless. The mere fact that defendant intended to
cause decedent some minor property injury should not excuse dece-
dent's failure to act reasonably to protect his own life. This defendant
did nothing that suggests that he should be deprived of the right to use
comparative fault with respect to this unintended injury.
Eggshell plaintiff cases present a similar problem, but one that is
more difficult because the intended and actual injuries often are more
closely related. For example, in Vosburg v. Putney,1 31 defendant kicked
plaintiff, intending that the kick be offensive but not harmful. Because
of plaintiff's poor physical condition, which was not known to defend-
ant, the kick caused plaintiff serious injury. Suppose that plaintiff had
carelessly forgotten to wear a bandage that he knew he needed to pro-
possessor's interest in the land knowingly and intentionally. Nevertheless, jurisdictions following
the modern view hold that the landowner owes this intentional tortfeasor a duty of reasonable care
under the circumstances and can be held liable for injuries sustained by the trespasser regardless
of the fact that the trespasser knowingly was committing an intentional tort.
130. 319 Mich. 661, 30 N.W.2d 358 (1947).
131. 80 Wis. 523, 50 N.W. 403 (1891).
[Vol. 46:121
1993] COMPARATIVE FAULT
tect himself and which would have prevented the kick from causing the
extensive damage. Under these facts, plaintiff's argument regarding the
extensive injuries is that, because defendant intended to give offense by
touching him, plaintiff's fault in failing to wear the bandage must be
forgiven and defendant should be saddled with the entire loss. The in-
tended injury and the injury sued upon, however, are significantly dif-
ferent. Plaintiff can at most show that defendant was negligent as to
the extensive injuries. Furthermore, defendant did not try to take ad-
vantage of plaintiff's carelessness or do anything else that would seem
to make him less deserving of plaintiffs care than, for example, a de-
fendant who carelessly created a foreseeable risk of seriously injuring a
plaintiff. Comparative fault should be used'3 1 in cases similar to
Vosburg.
132. If, as the text suggests, in intentional tort cases the eggshell plaintiff rule is limited to
instances in which plaintiff's susceptibility was not caused by her fault, the intended injury and
the injury sued upon were of the same type, or defendant took advantage of plaintiff's susceptibil-
ity, those same limitations should be used in negligence cases. Thus, if defendant in Vosburg had
negligently touched plaintiff, causing the same extensive injuries that plaintiff could have avoided
by wearing a bandage, defendant should not be fully liable for those injuries, assuming the jury
decides that plaintiff was also negligent and that his negligence was a proximate cause of the inju-
ries. This may change the law, although it is not certain in which direction. Compare Spier v.
Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 323 N.E.2d 164 (1974) (plaintiff can recover nothing for enhanced injuries
sustained as a result of her failure to wear an available seatbelt), with Clarkson v. Wright, 108 Ill.
2d 129, 483 N.E.2d 268 (1985) (improper to consider plaintiff's failure to wear a seatbelt). Such
change is desirable, however, for the same reasons that comparative fault is desirable in instances
in which plaintiff's fault is a cause of the incident rather than merely a cause of the extended
injury.
An additional point should be made. As suggested by Professor McNichols, the rejection of
the eggshell plaintiff rule under these conditions need not mean that plaintiff will bear full respon-
sibility for the unintended injuries. McNichols, 37 Okla. L. Rev. at 676-77 (cited in note 19). Be-
cause the fault of both plaintiff and defendant were factors in causing those injuries, each should
be partially responsible.
Finally, the mention of Spier, which treated the damages caused by plaintiff's failure to wear
an available seatbelt as if they were a type of avoidable consequence for which plaintiff would be
responsible, raises the issue of the relation between the avoidable consequences rule and the use of
comparative fault in certain intentional tort cases. There is disagreement whether plaintiff's negli-
gent failure to mitigate damages is relevant when defendant's tort was intentional. Professor
Dobbs asserts that an intentional tort plaintiff is denied recovery under the avoidable conse-
quences rule only if she "was reckless or intentional in failing to protect [her] own interests," Dan
B. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies 186 (West, 1973), while Professor McCormick con-
tends that the victim of an intentional tort "should still within reason be expected to avoid unnec-
essary harm," McCormick, Law of Damages at 139 n.58 (cited in note 116). The Second
Restatement takes an intermediate position, holding that the avoidable consequences rule does not
apply "if the tortfeasor intended the harm ... unless the injured person with knowledge of the
danger of the harm intentionally or heedlessly failed to protect his own interest." Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 918(2) (1977).
A conflict exists between Professor Dobbs's approach to the avoidable consequences rule and
this Article's proposal to use comparative fault in some intentional tort cases, for there is no good
reason to hold plaintiff harmless when she carelessly exacerbates an injury caused by an inten-
tional tort, but to hold her responsible for part of the consequences of her carelessness when it
combines with defendant's intentional conduct to cause her initial injury.
Professor McCormick's approach to avoidable consequences comports with my proposal in
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Transferred intent cases involve similar considerations. In these
cases, thanks to a legal fiction, defendant is held to have committed an
intentional tort even though he did not have the requisite intent as to
plaintiff. The reasons for this doctrine are not entirely clear.' Perhaps
intent is transferred to punish defendant, perhaps to deter. But, as dis-
most respects although at first glance it seems to consider plaintiff's fault in two situations in
which this Article would find that inappropriate: when defendant took advantage of plaintiff's
carelessness and when defendant intended the harm knowing facts under which he had no right to
inflict that harm. Regarding the first possible difference, no real conflict exists between Professor
McCormick's rule and this proposal because the situation could not arise in the traditional avoida-
ble consequences case. In such a case plaintiff's careless conduct occurred after defendant's tort,
and thus defendant never could have taken advantage of plaintiff's carelessness. There may be a
conflict between the position taken in this Article and Professor McCormick's avoidable conse-
quences rule, however, in that he would permit plaintiff's carelessness to be considered "within
reason" (i.e., when it is reasonable to do so) even when defendant intended the harm. Given Pro-
fessor McCormick's "within reason" limitation, this conflict appears to be negligible if a conflict
exists at all.
The limits imposed on the avoidable consequences rule by the Second Restatement are quite
similar to those that this Article proposes be imposed on the use of comparative fault. First, the
Second Restatement uses the avoidable consequences rule and thereby considers plaintiff's fault in
intentional tort cases in which the harm was not intended. The proposal espoused in this Article
also usually considers plaintiff's fault in intentional tort cases in which the harm was not intended.
An apparent difference between the two is that under my proposal there is an exception: plaintiff's
fault is not considered even though the harm was not intended if defendant took advantage of that
fault. No similar exception exists in the Second Restatement approach to avoidable consequences
probably because, as explained above, it is not possible that defendant took advantage of plaintiff's
carelessness in the traditional avoidable consequences case. Consequently, no real conflict exists
between the two propositions in this respect.
Second, if defendant intended the harm that he caused, plaintiff's negligence in causing that
harm usually is ignored under both Section 918 and this proposal. One point of departure between
the two approaches to intended harms is that under my proposal a defendant who intended the
injury nevertheless can use plaintiff's fault to decrease his liability if he believed that facts existed
which, had they existed, would have justified his conduct. No such exception exists to the Second
Restatement's prohibition on the use of the avoidable consequences rule when defendant intended
the harm. Thus, a conflict exists, albeit not major, between my proposal and the Second Restate-
ment's avoidable consequences rule.
Third, the Second Restatement applies the avoidable consequences rule to intended harms if
plaintiff "intentionally or heedlessly failed to protect his own interests." Id. The somewhat compa-
rable provision of my proposal applies when plaintiff provoked defendant. Thus, my proposal is, in
theory, both broader (it considers plaintiff's fault when she intentionally or negligently provoked)
and narrower (plaintiff's fault that does not amount to provocation is not considered, even if inten-
tional) than the Restatement's avoidable consequences rule. However, these differences are not
likely to surface frequently. Negligent provocation is unusual, and a plaintiff who engaged in inten-
tional faulty conduct that caused her injury almost certainly will have provoked defendant.
Logic and consistency require that jurisdictions that adopt this proposal concerning compara-
tive fault also adopt a similar approach to avoidable consequences. Both the Second Restatement
and Professor McCormick set forth an avoidable consequences rule that, with minor modifications,
would comport with the approach to comparative fault taken herein.
133. Perhaps the reasons for transferring intent lie in history, rather than in present day
goals. See Keeton, et al., Torts § 8 at 37-38 (cited in note 4).
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cussed above,1 34 those goals provide little reason to reject comparative
fault. Furthermore, they would be advanced even if plaintiff's fault
were considered because defendant nevertheless would be required to
pay for at least part of the injury he caused even though he caused it
unintentionally and without negligence. Prosser posits that the reason
for transferring intent is that defendant should be held liable for dam-
age caused by his wrongful act even though the harm was unin-
tended.135 This may explain why defendant should be held liable, but
provides no reason for ignoring plaintiff's wrongful conduct. The partic-
ular goals of transferred intent do not require that plaintiff's fault be
ignored. Are there other reasons why that should be done?
There are two types of transferred intent cases. In one type, de-
fendant intended one harm but caused a different harm. As in Vosberg,
this defendant merely created a risk of the injury for which compensa-
tion is sought. Comparative fault should be used, as discussed in con-
nection with Vosberg.
In the other type of transferred intent case, defendant intended
and inflicted the same type of harm, but the victim was not the person
at whom the conduct was directed. Once again, defendant did not in-
tend the injury for which plaintiff seeks compensation, for he merely
created a risk that it would result. Furthermore, as far as plaintiff is
concerned, the fact that her injury was caused by conduct that was in-
tended to injure another person is a mere fortuity. That fortuity pro-
vides one major benefit to plaintiff: she is allowed to recover without
proving that defendant either intended the injury or was negligent in
causing it. That fortuity provides no reason to give plaintiff a second
benefit by ignoring her fault. As discussed in connection with Vosberg,
comparative fault should be used.
D. Defendant Intended the Harm, Aware of Facts That Gave Him
No Privilege to Inflict It (E.g., Defendant Shot a Dog for Fun)
At first blush it seems that defendants in this category have little
standing to complain of plaintiffs' faulty conduct.13 6 These defendants
134. See text accompanying notes 93-107.
135. Keeton, et al., Torts § 8 at 38 (cited in note 4).
136. Oddly, in one group of these cases, the courts have rejected the usual prohibition
against considering plaintiffs' fault in intentional tort cases and have held that even defendants
who intended the harm can rely on plaintiff's misconduct to bar plaintiff's claims. Victims of de-
ceit must prove that their reliance on defendants' misstatements was justified under the circum-
stances. Id. § 108 at 750-53. Although general agreement exists that this does not mean that the
plaintiff in a deceit case must act as a reasonable person, id.; Restatement (Second) of Torts §
545A (1976); Ampat/Midwest, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 896 F.2d 1035, 1041-43 (7th Cir.
1990), it does mean that she owes defendant some duty, perhaps a duty not to be reckless, see
Ampat/Midwest, Inc., 896 F.2d at 1041-42. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 541 (1976). This
1993]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
intended to cause the particular harms of which plaintiffs complain,
and the facts as defendants understood them gave defendants no justi-
fication for inflicting such harms. If plaintiffs' faulty conduct helped
such defendants accomplish their objectives, that is nothing of which
defendants have a right to complain.""
Nevertheless, a few defendants in this group do have a legitimate
complaint about plaintiffs' faulty behavior. In certain instances plain-
tiffs' faulty conduct actually may have caused defendants to commit
torts instead of merely making it easier for them to do so. Defendants
who were thus provoked could point out that prohibiting a defendant
from complaining about plaintiffs' failure to use care to prevent defend-
ant from accomplishing his objective is quite different from prohibiting
such a defendant from complaining of plaintiffs' fault in causing de-
fendant to commit the tort. The plight of a handicapped person who
was taunted until he hit his tormentor, who then sued him for battery,
should convince most readers of the validity of considering provocation
in assessing liability. The provoker should not be absolved of all respon-
sibility for her faulty conduct simply because defendant succumbed to
it.
One problem with reducing liability to reflect plaintiff's provoca-
tion is line-drawing. Some courts may want to distinguish the handi-
capped defendant mentioned above from the car thief who claims that
his liability should be reduced because his victim carelessly left her car
unlocked thereby tempting him to take the car. Is there some authority
to which the courts can look to decide when plaintiff's provocation
should be considered? Only a few jurisdictions have held that defend-
ant's liability is decreased when plaintiff provoked the tort,138 and the
cases from those jurisdictions either shed little light on what type of
conduct qualifies as provocation or take an extremely broad view of the
requirement is said to be justified because it provides a way to corroborate plaintiff's assertion that
she actually did rely. Keeton, et al., Torts § 108 at 750 (cited in note 4); AmpatlMidwest, Inc., 896
F.2d at 1042. No reason is suggested, however, why this one aspect of plaintiff's case requires
corroboration. If plaintiff can convince the jury that she-however carelessly-actually did rely on
defendant's misstatement and that defendant intended that she rely, that should satisfy this part
of the deceit case.
137. The conclusion that this type of defendant should not be allowed to rely on plaintiffs'
fault to decrease his damages is bolstered in cases in which holding defendant to be only partially
responsible would enable defendant to profit from a wrong. For example, if a thief who was sued
for conversion could decrease his liability because plaintiff's carelessness had made the theft possi-
ble, the thief would be liable for less than the full value of the stolen item and thus would profit
from the theft, a result contrary to public policy.
138. See, for example, Jones v. Thomas, 557 So. 2d 1015 (La. Ct. App. 1990); Kennedy v.
Parrino, 555 So. 2d 990 (La. Ct. App. 1990); Robinson v. Hardy, 505 So. 2d 767 (La. Ct. App.
1987); Neville v. Johnson, 398 So. 2d 111 (La. Ct. App. 1981); Hall v. Coplon, 355 S.E.2d 195 (N.C.
App. 1987).
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type of conduct amounting to provocation.
The North Carolina case that permits mitigation based on plain-
tiff's provocation gives no definition of the type of conduct that
amounts to provocation, but merely states that breaking and entering
defendant's home would be sufficient.139 Thus, the case provides little
guidance as to what type of conduct on plaintiff's part should be
considered.
Mississippi, by statute, and Louisiana, by case law, take a very
broad view of the type of conduct on plaintiff's part that justifies miti-
gation of her damages. The Mississippi statute permits "any mitigating
circumstances" '1 0 to be considered. Louisiana courts have held that
"any conduct or action which contributes to the circumstances giving
rise to the injury""" can be considered. Later cases appear to narrow
this holding by using plaintiff's conduct to mitigate damages only if it
justifies "a finding of fault on the part of plaintiff." '42 Under such a
broad definition of provocation, the car thief could assert that his liabil-
ity should be decreased to reflect the car owner's fault in leaving her
keys in the car. Although this possibility seems unwarranted, it may not
be especially troubling1 43 as juries facing such a claim would undoubt-
edly allocate all or nearly all of the fault to the thief.
Any jurisdiction that wants to confine the provocation argument
more strictly might do so by borrowing concepts from the somewhat
analogous criminal law defense of entrapment.4 Entrapment, as usu-
ally defined, occurs when a government agent induces a defendant to
commit an offense that he was not predisposed to commit.'45 Merely
139. Hall v. Coplon, 355 S.E.2d 195 (N.C. App. 1987).
140. Miss. Code § 11-7-61 (1972). The statute applies only to the torts listed therein, includ-
ing a number of intentional torts.
141. Harris v. Pineset, 499 So. 2d 499, 503 (La. Ct. App. 1987).
142. Jones v. Thomas, 557 So. 2d 1015, 1018 (La. Ct. App. 1990). Accord Baugh v. Redmond,
565 So. 2d 953, 959-60 (La. Ct. App. 1990).
143. This conclusion is not invariably true. Under some circumstances the adoption of an
extremely broad definition of provocation could lead to very troubling results. For example, under
the standard set out in Harris, a woman who was attacked when she entered a bar could have her
damages reduced because the jury disapproved of her going to a bar. 499 So.2d at 503. Such a
possibility shows that courts must define provocation with some care.
144. Reasons similar to those given for recognizing the entrapment defense support the use
of comparative fault in intentional tort cases involving provocation. One reason given for the en-
trapment defense is that it is necessary to do justice: the government should not be able to lure the
innocent into committing crimes and then punish them for those crimes. Wayne R. LaFave and
Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law 423 (West, 2d ed. 1986). Similarly, a private person who was at
fault in causing another to commit a tort should not be permitted to collect fully for injuries
caused by that tort. The second justification for the entrapment defense is to enable the courts to
control police excesses. Id. at 424. Although courts have no corresponding duty to control private
citizens who torment others, it seems desirable for them to try to influence such people.
145. LaFave and Scott, Criminal Law at § 5.2(b).
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affording "opportunities or facilities for the commission of the of-
fense"'" 6 is not sufficient inducement to constitute entrapment. 14 7
Under this approach our handicapped person would be able to use com-
parative fault, but the car thief would not.
The parallel between entrapment and provocation, however, is not
exact. First, unlike the police in entrapment situations, most people
who provoke torts probably do not intend that their victims actually
commit the torts. Rather they hope that the victim will suffer but not
otherwise respond. Thus, the intent element present in cases of entrap-
ment often will be missing in instances of provocation. Second, the po-
lice conduct in entrapment cases may not have been as egregious as
plaintiffs' behavior in instances of provocation. In the case of entrap-
ment, conduct similar to that engaged in by the police was desirable,
but the police went too far. Provocation, on the other hand, does not
involve an unreasonable extension of useful conduct; in these cases
there is no justification for conduct that is at all similar to that in which
plaintiffs engaged. Finally, the consequences of a finding that plaintiff
provoked defendant are much less severe than those resulting from a
finding of entrapment. In the provocation situation plaintiff's recovery
will be reduced; in the entrapment situation plaintiff will lose.
In view of these differences between entrapment cases and provo-
cation cases, tort law need not import all or any of the conclusions
reached by the criminal law regarding the type of conduct sufficient to
trigger the entrapment defense. Nevertheless, entrapment and provoca-
tion are sufficiently similar that entrapment cases can provide some
guidance to courts facing claims that plaintiff provoked defendant.
Courts should permit defendants to argue that a plaintiff who was
at fault in provoking the tort should have her damages reduced to re-
flect that fault. By doing so they would send a message that this type of
behavior is unacceptable, and they might deter some provokers, thus
reducing the number of these incidents. While some courts might elect
to follow the lead of Louisiana and Mississippi and broadly define prov-
ocation, others might opt to develop a more restrictive definition, per-
haps similar to the definition of entrapment used in criminal law. When
plaintiff's fault does not amount to provocation, a defendant who in-
tended to inflict the harm of which plaintiff complains and who knew of
facts that gave him no privilege to inflict the harm should be prohibited
from using comparative fault.
One final issue concerning the use of comparative fault in inten-
146. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441 (1932), quoted in Jacobson v. United
States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1540 (1992).
147. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 441.
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tional tort cases remains to be considered. Some jurisdictions recently
have concluded that plaintiffs injured as a direct result of their partici-
pation in criminal activity cannot recover for their injuries, at least if
their criminality was serious.148 The reasons that lead jurisdictions to
deny injured criminals access to the courts to redress their injuries also
might lead them to prohibit criminals from using comparative fault
when the criminal's fault during the commission of a crime contributed
to the injury about which the criminal complains. This would create
another category of people who are not permitted to use comparative
fault. Is there justification for depriving these criminals of the right to
use comparative fault to decrease their liability? Should criminality
have any part to play in the decision to use comparative fault?
The New York Court of Appeals confronted this issue in Barker v.
Kallash."49 The court held that the fifteen-year-old plaintiff who was
injured while building a pipe bomb could not recover from those who
sold him the explosive "because the public policy of this State generally
denies judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a seri-
ous criminal act.'150 The reasons given by the Barker court for refusing
to permit recovery by a person injured as a direct result of serious crim-
inal behavior were that criminals should not profit from their own
wrongdoing and that the criminal law should be obeyed. 15
The Barker opinions traced the argument about profiting from a
wrong to a case in which a beneficiary under a will murdered the testa-
tor to obtain his inheritance. 52 The rationale made some sense in that
context, but does not appear to be applicable to tort lawsuits, in which
no profit can be made. In tort suits, the issue is how to allocate a loss
that has occurred. Even if the person who suffered the loss recovers for
the entire loss, he in no way has profited; at most he has broken even.
Because there is little possibility of profiting from a wrong, 53 this rea-
148. Alaska Stat. § 09.017.030 (Supp. 1991); Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 468 N.E.2d 39
(1984). Although these authorities, by their terms, apply to intentional tort suits, the author
doubts that they will be interpreted to do so because such an interpretation would render those
engaging in serious criminal conduct "fair game" for intentional tortfeasors. Indeed, in McCum-
mings v. New York City Transit Auth., an intentional tort case, a lower New York court did not
discuss the possibility of barring plaintiff's claim because his injury was sustained as a direct result
of his participation in a serious crime. 177 A.D.2d 24, 580 N.Y.S.2d 931 (1992).
149. 63 N.Y.2d 19, 468 N.E.2d 39 (1984).
150. 468 N.E.2d at 41.
151. 468 N.E.2d at 41.
152. Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889).
153. Theoretically, a person could profit in a tort suit if she were awarded punitive damages.
Punitive damages, however, are not always available and are unlikely, even if available, to be
awarded to a person injured while committing a serious crime. But see Katko v. Briney, 183
N.W.2d 657 (Iowa 1971); Allison v. Fiscus, 156 Ohio St. 120, 100 N.E.2d 237 (1951). Even if puni-
tive damages were awarded, plaintiff probably would not profit; she still must pay attorney's fees,
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son for refusing to permit criminalA to recover in tort is a red herring.
The second reason offered by the Barker court-that the law
should be obeyed-presumes that refusing to hear criminals' tort claims
will cause people to obey the criminal law. Refusing to permit injured
criminals to recover seems unlikely to cause potential criminals to obey
the law: a person who is not deterred from criminal activity by the pos-
sibilities of personal injury and criminal penalties is unlikely to be de-
terred by the chance that she may be unable to recover damages for
such injury. Even assuming that refusing to permit criminal plaintiffs to
recover does deter some criminals, that refusal often, as in Barker,
could relieve another criminal of liability,154 thus removing a disincen-
tive for that person to engage in the criminal conduct. It is difficult to
see how that result encourages obedience to the criminal law.
Perhaps the Barker court was motivated by a desire not to appear
to condone illegal conduct by recognizing a criminal's claim. In contract
cases this appears to be the primary reason for refusing to enforce many
illegal agreements."5 The courts' concern about appearances is stronger
in contract cases, in which the court is being asked to enforce an illegal
agreement, than in tort suits, in which no action to further an illegal
scheme is sought. Even in contract cases, however, this concern is not
always decisive, for illegal contracts sometimes are enforced. 56 In many
tort cases the courts do not find it necessary to bar their doors to
criminals even though the criminals are complaining of injuries received
while committing serious crimes. For example, criminals intentionally
injured during the commission of crimes sometimes may recover for
those injuries; 157 criminal plaintiffs may be able to recover if their crim-
inal conduct was a "condition" rather than a "cause" of their injuries;' 58
and criminals who are defendants in negligence cases often can rely on
plaintiff's negligence to bar or decrease their liability. 5 ' This evidence
that, in many situations, the courts have overcome their fear of appear-
and assuming the views expressed in this Article are adopted and comparative fault is available to
reduce defendant's liability, plaintiff's compensatory award likely would be considerably less than
her damage.
154. The two defendants in Barker not only were building the bomb with plaintiff, but alleg-
edly had obtained the explosives used in the bomb. 468 N.E.2d at 39.
155. John D. Calamari and Joseph M. Perillo, Contracts § 22-1 at 888 (West, 3d ed. 1987).
156. Id. §§ 22-1 to 22-4.
157. See, for example, Katko v. Briney, 183 N.W.2d 657 (Iowa 1971); McCummings v. New
York City Transit Auth., 177 A.D.2d 24, 580 N.Y.S.2d 931 (1992); Allison v. Fiscus, 156 Ohio St.
120, 100 N.E.2d 237 (1951); Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 79 (1963). It should be noted that
the criminal plaintiff's conduct in McCummings (beating and robbing an old man) was much more
reprehensible than in Barker (making a pipebomb), but McCummings was allowed access to the
courts.
158. E.R. Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 Harv. L. Rev. 317, 338-42 (1913).
159. Keeton, et al., Torts § 65 at 461 (cited in note 4).
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ing to condone crime if they recognize the claims of criminals is some
indication that such a fear is not a particularly strong justification for
prohibiting recovery.
In the context of comparative fault, the issue of one party's crimi-
nal conduct most likely would arise in one of two ways: (1) the criminal
could be a defendant seeking to decrease his liability for injuries he
inflicted during a crime by proving that plaintiff's fault was a cause of
her injury; or (2) the criminal could be a plaintiff, injured during the
course of a crime, who wants to recover in full from defendant even
though her fault contributed to her injury.
When the criminal is a defendant seeking to decrease his liability
because plaintiff's fault contributed to her injury, the arguments for re-
fusing to hear his claim would seem to be the same as those cited to
support the refusal to permit injured criminals to recover. 16 0 As noted
above those reasons are extremely weak. Moreover, they are offset by
the need to discourage the other party from engaging in tortious con-
duct. They provide insufficient reason for rejecting the benefits of com-
parative fault.
When the criminal is plaintiff, the reasons causing some courts to
bar their doors to criminals would support the use of comparative fault,
for comparative fault would decrease the criminal's recovery. Such a
result would decrease any "profit" the criminal otherwise might make,
increase the criminal's incentive to obey the law, and lessen any appear-
ance that the court condones criminal conduct. The reasons why some
courts deny relief to some criminals indicate that comparative fault
should be used in this instance.
Because the usual reasons for using comparative fault are, in the
instance of a plaintiff injured while engaged in criminal conduct, aug-
mented by these additional reasons, a defendant who, under the views
espoused in this Article, is prohibited from using comparative fault
might claim that that prohibition should be lifted because plaintiff's
conduct was criminal.161 Defendant is prevented from using compara-
160. Keep in mind that, under the proposal advanced in this Article, defendants can never
use comparative fault if they intended the injury and realized that facts existed which gave them
no right to inflict that injury or if they took advantage of plaintiff's carelessness. Consequently,
most defendants who injure people during the commission of crimes would not be able to use
comparative fault.
161. The appeal of the argument advanced by this defendant probably arises from the likeli-
hood that the criminal's fault in such a case will involve some type of provocation. For example,
under the general approach taken in this Article, it initially might appear that a defendant whose
spring gun shot plaintiff as she broke into his warehouse should be denied the benefits of compara-
tive fault. Defendant intended an injury substantially similar to the one inflicted, and the facts, as
he understood them, gave him no right to engage in this type of conduct. This plaintiff's criminal
conduct, however, which certainly involves fault, was the reason the tort was committed; it pro-
voked defendant. Consequently, plaintiff's fault in provoking defendant should be considered in
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tive fault only if he intended the injury aware of facts that gave him no
right to inflict the injury, or if he took advantage of plaintiff's fault. In
both of these instances, defendant simply has no right to complain
about plaintiff's faulty conduct. The unconvincing reasons offered to
explain why criminals should be denied access to the courts are insuffi-
cient to justify allowing such a defendant to use plaintiff's fault to re-
duce his liability.
Regardless of the criminal nature of either party's conduct, courts
should use comparative fault in most types of intentional tort cases, for
doing so advances the goals of comparative fault, enhances the courts'
ability to consider both parties' faulty conduct, better enables the
courts to spread losses, and does not undermine the other goals of tort
law. Exceptions" 2 arise when defendant either took advantage of plain-
tiff's fault or intended the harm of which plaintiff complains, knowing
that facts existed under which he had no right to inflict that harm. In
those two cases, defendant should be denied the use of comparative
fault because his conduct shows that he abandoned any right he might
have had to complain of plaintiff's fault. Even in those instances, how-
ever, comparative fault should be used if plaintiffs faulty conduct
caused defendant to commit the tort.
V. WOULD COMPARATIVE FAULT IMPOSE AN UNTOWARD ADMINISTRATIVE
BURDEN?
Regardless of the intellectual merits of a proposal to change tort
law, no such proposal can be justified if the burden it imposes on courts
and litigants exceeds the benefits it creates. Thus, it is necessary to at-
tempt to assess the burdens that might be created by the use of com-
parative fault in intentional tort cases.
Although estimating the additional burden, if any, is necessarily
somewhat speculative, a rough idea of that burden can be obtained by
studying the effect of the adoption of comparative fault in negligence
cases. A 1959 study'63 concluded that the "[i]ntroduction of compara-
tive negligence . . .did not drastically alter the size or quality of the
courts' burdens in processing these cases.' 64 A 1969 update of this
study reached the same conclusion'65 as did a study of the effect of the
determining damages even though defendant intended the injury. As a result, no need exists for a
"criminal conduct" exception to permit the use of comparative fault in this type of case.
162. In addition to the general exceptions discussed here, a different, limited exception exists
in conversion cases because of the nature of the remedy provided in those cases. See note 118.
163. Maurice Rosenberg, Comparative Negligence in Arkansas: A "Before and After" Sur-
vey, 13 Ark. L. Rev. 89 (1959).
164. Id. at 108.
165. Billy Joe Thompson, Note, Comparative Negligence-A Survey of the Arkansas Expe-
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adoption of comparative negligence on automobile insurance. 16 6 In as-
sessing the relevance of this conclusion to the present inquiry, it is
helpful to discuss the particular findings on which the conclusion was
based and to decide whether those findings likely would be replicated if
comparative fault were to be used in intentional tort cases.
The Arkansas study made the following findings: Comparative neg-
ligence "did not affect the preference for jury trials in personal injury
cases; did not appreciably affect the length of trials; increased potential
litigation; promoted before-trial settlements; and made damages harder
to determine."067 Is it likely that these findings would differ if the issue
were the use of comparative fault in intentional tort cases?
With respect to the preference for jury trials, it would seem that
the effect of the use of comparative fault would be, if possible, less in
intentional tort cases than in negligence suits. In the negligence context
it was argued that the contributory negligence rule caused contribu-
torily negligent plaintiffs to request jury trials in the hope that the jury
would ignore the court's instructions on contributory negligence and re-
turn a verdict for plaintiff. 6 ' Thus, the argument went, the introduc-
tion of comparative fault would obviate one reason for demanding
juries, thus reducing the number of jury trials and lessening the burden
on the courts.'6 9 Yet, according to the Arkansas study, the use of com-
parative fault did not affect the demand for jury trials in personal in-
jury suits. 17 0 Either plaintiffs' hopes that the jury would disregard the
instructions on contributory negligence was not the decisive factor in
their decisions to demand jury trials, or if it was, the use of comparative
fault caused sufficient additional defendants to demand a jury so that
defendant-requested juries replaced those previously requested by
plaintiffs.
In the intentional tort context, it might be argued that the law's
refusal to consider plaintiff's fault would encourage defendants to ask
for juries in the hope that the jury would, despite instructions, take
plaintiff's fault into account and decrease plaintiff's damage award.
Such an incentive would be offset to some extent by the prevalent belief
rience, 22 Ark. L. Rev. 692 (1969).
166. Cornelius J. Peck, Comparative Negligence and Automobile Liability Insurance, 58
Mich. L. Rev. 689, 707-22 (1960) (comparative negligence had no observable effect on either the
frequency with which claims were filed or insurance rates).
167. Rosenberg, 13 Ark. L. Rev. at 108 (cited in note 163). The increased difficulty in deter-
mining damages, although listed here, is elsewhere said to account for the fact that trials did not
become shorter. Because this increased difficulty actually is reflected in another noted factor, I will
not discuss it separately.
168. Id. at 92.
169. Id. at 92, 100-02.
170. Id. at 101.
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that juries tend to award more damages than judges do' 7 ' and by the
possibility that evidence of plaintiff's fault would be held irrelevant and
inadmissible, in which case it obviously could not influence the jury.
Consequently, the present treatment of plaintiff's fault in intentional
tort suits may give defendants a weak incentive to demand a jury trial,
while providing plaintiffs with a weak incentive not to do so. The use of
comparative fault would remove both of these incentives. Given that
the removal of similar but stronger reasons 172 to demand a jury was
insufficient to decrease the number of juries demanded in negligence
suits, it is very unlikely that the removal of these weaker reasons would
have a noticeable impact on jury demands in intentional tort cases.
The Arkansas study also concluded that the use of comparative
fault did not "appreciably affect the length of trials.' 173 Because com-
parative fault clearly introduces a new issue-the comparison of the
171. This perception appears to have some basis in fact. In 1964 Professor Kalven deter-
mined that juries award about 20% more than do judges. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the
Civil Jury, 50 Va. L. Rev. 1055, 1064 (1964). A 1990 study concluded that the median jury award
in tort cases was $26,213; the median judge award was $8,500. David B. Rottman, Tort Litigation
in the State Courts: Evidence From the Trial Courts Information Network, St. Ct. J. 1, 12 (Fall
1990).
172. In negligence cases under contributory negligence, both of these factors encouraged
.plaintiffs to demand a jury: a jury might disregard instructions and permit a negligent plaintiff to
recover, and a jury is more likely than a judge to return a large damage award. In an intentional
tort case, the factors cut in opposite directions. On the one hand, defendant may prefer a jury
because he hopes that the jury will disregard instructions and decrease plaintiff's damages to re-
flect plaintiff's fault. On the other hand, defendant may fear that a jury will decide that plaintiff's
damage is much more extensive than would a judge. Thus, the defendant's concern that the jury
will overestimate plaintiff's damage will, to some extent, offset his hope that the jury will decrease
plaintiff's recovery to reflect his fault. The value of this rather attenuated incentive is further
undermined by the possibility that evidence of plaintiff's fault might be inadmissible. Conse-
quently, the plaintiff's incentive to demand a jury under the contributory negligence rule seems to
have been considerably stronger than any possible corresponding incentive on the part of inten-
tional tort defendants.
173. Rosenberg, 13 Ark. L. Rev. at 108 (cited in note 163). The study concluded that the
reason trial length did not change was that "the greater difficulty of determining the damage issue
was probably offset by greater ease in determining the liability issue." Id. at 102. While the re-
sponses to the questionnaires supported this conclusion, it is difficult to see why such an offset
would exist. In negligence cases in which plaintiff's fault is an issue, the use of comparative fault
may simplify the liability issue because plaintiff's fault is no longer considered in the liability
phase. Plaintiff's fault remains in the case, however, as an issue to be decided in the damages
phase, in which it is joined by a totally new issue-the share of culpability assigned to each party.
Thus, it seems clear that there is no offset, but instead, the addition of a new issue.
Furthermore, in any case in which plaintiff's fault is clear, the use of comparative fault would
make the liability phase of the trial more difficult, for it would require the jury to decide if defend-
ant's conduct was negligent instead of simply finding for defendant because plaintiff had been
contributorily negligent. An offset may result from the greater ease with which juries, freed from
the draconian results of contributory negligence, can decide negligence cases under comparative
fault. This type of offset should be replicated in those intentional tort cases-for example, those
requiring decisions on the reasonableness of defendant's belief that plaintiff consented to defend-
ant's conduct-that now require juries to make similarly unappealing decisions.
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fault of the parties-into the trial, this is rather surprising. There is no
reason to suppose that the introduction of this issue into intentional
tort cases would have a greater impact on the length of those trials than
it had in negligence cases. The use of comparative fault in intentional
tort cases would, however, in some cases, introduce a second new issue:
plaintiff's fault.1"4 In those cases in which plaintiff's fault would not
have been an issue,17 5 this might lengthen trials. The increased burden
imposed by this second issue, however, would be mitigated by the de-
creased difficulty with which jurors, no longer faced with imposing the
entire loss on one of two faulty parties, could decide the liability issue
in intentional tort cases. Despite this offset the use of comparative fault
in intentional tort cases probably would lengthen some trials even
though its use did not noticeably lengthen negligence trials. Neverthe-
less, given the experience in negligence trials and the fact that even
under the present rules plaintiff's fault is an issue in many of the inten-
tional tort cases in which comparative fault would be raised, no reason
exists to believe that the use of comparative fault would make inten-
tional tort trials dramatically longer.
The Arkansas study found that the use of comparative fault in-
creased litigation17 6 presumably because some negligent plaintiffs sued
when they could expect a partial recovery even though they would not
have sued if their negligence would have barred them from any recov-
ery. The use of comparative fault in intentional tort cases, however,
should decrease the number of lawsuits. Instead of permitting recov-
eries that previously were not available, as happened in negligence
cases, the use of comparative fault in intentional tort cases would re-
duce the amount that some plaintiffs could expect to recover. As a re-
sult, some suits would become uneconomical and would not be brought.
This reduction in the number of lawsuits would ameliorate any burden
created by the increase in the number of issues to be addressed at trial
once comparative fault is introduced into intentional tort cases.
174. Plaintiff's fault is presently an issue in only a minority of intentional tort cases. For
example, plaintiff's fault is sometimes relevant to whether a privilege exists. See Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts §§ 77, 88, 101, 119 (1963). In some jurisdictions provocation mitigates compensatory
damages, and in most jurisdictions it can mitigate punitive damages. Keeton, et al., Torts § 19 at
126 (cited in note 4); Linda L. Schlueter and Kenneth R. Redden, Punitive Damages 211-12
(Michie, 2d ed. 1989). Furthermore, when plaintiff's fault is not at issue, her conduct, which would
require proof similar to that needed to show her fault, often is. For example, if the issue is whether
defendant reasonably believed he had to defend himself or reasonably believed that plaintiff con-
sented, evidence of plaintiff's conduct usually will be relevant even when comparative fault is not
used.
175. Although plaintiff's fault presently is relevant in only a minority of intentional tort
suits, that minority probably comprises a large part of the intentional tort cases in which compara-
tive fault would be raised.
176. Rosenberg, 13 Ark. L. Rev. at 108 (cited in note 163).
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The use of comparative fault in negligence suits was found to ease
the burdens on the courts by promoting settlements. 17 7 The study sug-
gested that defendants were less willing to settle when there was a pos-
sibility of totally avoiding liability by proving the plaintiff's
contributory negligence. 17 8 An explanation for this result, based on psy-
chology, is provided by prospect theory, which teaches that people are
risk-seeking when evaluating prospective losses and risk-averse when
considering possible gains. 7 9 Tort defendants usually would view the
lawsuit as posing a possible loss, but plaintiffs would perceive a possible
gain.' 0 Prospect theory holds that plaintiffs, being risk-averse, take less
money than they should, statistically, to avoid the risk that they will
lose the lawsuit and receive nothing. Similarly, defendants, who are
risk-seeking, demand more money than they deserve, statistically, to
give up the possibility that they will win the lawsuit and pay nothing.
In the context of contributory negligence, the relevant risk is that
plaintiff will be found to have been negligent and, therefore, will be
barred from recovery. To focus on that risk, consider a situation in
which the parties agree that defendant was negligent, that plaintiff's
damages were one hundred dollars, and that the chance that plaintiff
will be found to have been contributorily negligent is forty percent. The
value of plaintiff's claim is sixty dollars' 81 because if she goes to trial
there is a sixty percent chance that she will get one hundred dollars and
a forty percent chance that she will recover nothing. Prospect theory
indicates that because plaintiff is risk-averse she will be willing to take
less than sixty dollars in settlement to avoid the possibility that she
might recover nothing if she goes to trial. Defendant, however, is risk-
seeking and will not give up the chance to avoid liability unless he is
compensated not only for the statistical value of his lost chance (forty
dollars) but also for some additional amount that equals the value
which he attaches to the chance itself. Thus, our defendant will not
offer to settle for sixty dollars, but for some lesser amount.
This phenomenon would not affect the likelihood of settlement if it
177. Id. at 108.
178. Id. at 100.
179. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of
Choice, 211 Science 453 453 (1981).
180. Id. at 453. At the point that settlement negotiations are being considered, defendant
faces two possibilities: either he will have to pay money to plaintiff or he will not. Because he is
not in a position to gain anything from the suit, he should view it as a prospective loss. Corre-
spondingly, a plaintiff would see the suit as a potential gain.
181. Costs of settlement and litigation are ignored here to simplify the example. They would
not materially affect the analysis. For simplicity, I also ignore the tendency of juries to disregard
instructions about contributory negligence and award negligent plaintiffs damages. This tendency
would lessen the impact of the differing risk-taking characteristics of the parties, much as compar-
ative negligence does, see text accompanying notes 185-87, but would not otherwise change it.
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equally influenced plaintiffs and defendants.182 Prospect theory con-
cludes, however, that the effect of a risk on the decisionmaker's behav-
ior is greater when it concerns a risk of loss than when it concerns the
possibility of gain.18 3 Because defendants would be more affected by
this risk factor than would plaintiffs, settlements would tend to be more
difficult.18 4 When comparative negligence replaces contributory negli-
gence, the statistical value of the chance involved in litigating plaintiff's
fault decreases because a finding that plaintiff was at fault results in a
decreased recovery instead of no recovery.'85 As a result, the psychologi-
cal impact of that risk on the parties will be less, and the disparity
between the parties' evaluations of that risk also should be less. As that
disparity decreases, the difference between the settlement amounts ac-
ceptable to the parties decreases, making settlement more likely.
In addition, the impact of any disparity would be less under com-
parative negligence because a reasonable settlement figure for a given
case will always be higher than under contributory negligence. 8 6 As the
settlement value of a case increases, the importance of a given disparity
between the parties' settlement offers decreases. 8  Consequently, the
182. For example, if plaintiff thought that it was worth an extra five dollars to eliminate the
40% chance of losing the case and defendant would accept five dollars to give up his 40% chance
of winning the case, the case should settle although at a different dollar figure than if risk aversion
were not a factor. Here the settlement amount would be $55 instead of the $60 that would appear
to be statistically appropriate.
183. Tversky and Kahneman, 211 Science at 454 (cited in note 179).
184. To continue with the example discussed in note 182, although plaintiff is willing to give
up an extra five dollars to ensure a recovery, defendant, because he is more affected by the psycho-
logical risk factor than is plaintiff, will insist on "receiving" more than five dollars extra to give up
the 40% chance of having to pay nothing. Plaintiff will accept $55, but defendant will offer less
than $55 thus impeding settlement.
185. In the contributory negligence example discussed in the text at footnote 181, the statis-
tical value of the chance that plaintiff would be found negligent was $40-the amount at risk
($100) times the chance of losing that amount (40%). Under comparative fault the statistical value
of the chance would always be less than $40 because even if plaintiff is found negligent she will
recover something. In our example, there is still a 40% chance that plaintiff will be found negli-
gent, but the amount lost by plaintiff if such a finding is made will be less than $100. Determining
the amount at risk requires an additional fact-the percentage of the total fault attributable to
plaintiff-for that will determine the size of the reduction in the judgment. Assume in our exam-
ple, if plaintiff is found to have been at fault, her fault will be 50% of the total fault. That would
mean that her recovery would be $50 if she were found to have been negligent. Thus, the statistical
value of the chance that she would be found negligent is $20 (40% of $50) instead of $40.
186. The settlement figure is invariably higher under comparative fault because the careless
plaintiff will not be barred, but will recover something. Using the example given above, under
contributory negligence the statistically correct value of the case is $60 (the damages times the
chance that the damages will be recovered). Under comparative fault the statistically correct value
of the case is $80 because in addition to the 60% chance of full recovery there is a 40% chance of a
$50 recovery.
187. For example, a $3 disparity would be less likely to derail an $80 settlement than a $60
settlement. This common sense conclusion also is supported by research. See Tversky and
Kahneman, 211 Science at 453 (cited in note 179).
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use of comparative negligence instead of contributory negligence facili-
tates settlements in two ways: first, it decreases the difference between
the settlement amounts acceptable to the parties, and second, it lessens
the impact of whatever disparity remains between plaintiff's and de-
fendant's settlement offers.
The parties' differing evaluations of the value of the risk of litiga-
tion is one reason why comparative negligence made settlement likelier
in negligence suits. Those differing evaluations, however, usually would
have the opposite effect on settlements if comparative fault were intro-
duced into intentional tort cases. In intentional torts cases, because
plaintiff's fault usually is irrelevant, no legal risk would be attached to
it."' When there is no risk, risk aversion is obviously irrelevant. Com-
parative fault introduces a risk in that the jury may find plaintiff to
have been at fault, and if it does, the damages will be reduced. Because
the dollar value defendant assigns to the chance of having to pay only
decreased damages exceeds the amount plaintiff is willing to pay to
avoid the risk of collecting only decreased damages, the use of compara-
tive fault might hinder settlements in many intentional tort cases even
though it aided them in negligence suits. The fact that reasonable set-
tlement amounts under comparative fault would be lower would exacer-
bate this effect, thus increasing the impact of any disparity between the
settlement offers of plaintiffs and defendants. Consequently, the availa-
bility of comparative fault most likely would make it more difficult to
settle intentional tort suits.
In sum, the study of the effect on court administration of the use of
comparative fault in negligence cases concluded that "the net tendency
was not to tip the balance markedly in either direction."' 189 In reaching
that conclusion the authors relied on the four findings discussed above.
One of them-that the demand for jury trials did not change-should
be the same if comparative fault were applied to intentional tort cases.
The other three probably would differ in that the use of comparative
fault in intentional tort cases would: (1) slightly increase the length of
188. Although plaintiff's fault usually is irrelevant in these cases and evidence of that fault is
inadmissible, under some conditions it is considered. See note 174. In those cases, the conse-
quences of introducing comparative fault would differ from those described in the text. First, when
plaintiff's fault presently protects the intentional tort defendant from liability (for example, if
plaintiff knowingly caused defendant to believe that conditions existed which justified the defend-
ant in arresting plaintiff, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 119 (1963)), the use of comparative
fault should aid settlements as appears to have happened when comparative fault replaced con-
tributory negligence. Second, any time evidence of plaintiff's fault is admissible there is a possibil-
ity that the jury will decrease the damage award to reflect plaintiff's fault even though the court
instructs otherwise. When such a possibility exists, the introduction of comparative fault will not
introduce a totally new risk, but nevertheless, will increase the risk and thus have an effect similar
to that described in the text.
189. Rosenberg, 13 Ark. L. Rev. at 108 (cited in note 163).
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trials even though it did not have that effect in negligence cases; (2)
decrease the number of cases brought although it increased the number
of negligence cases brought; and (3) decrease the number of cases set-
tled even though settlements increased when comparative fault was
used in negligence cases.
In the negligence context it was found that the increased burden
imposed by additional lawsuits was offset by the increase in the number
of settlements. In the case of intentional torts, the question is whether
the increased burden imposed by slightly longer trials and somewhat
fewer settlements would be sufficiently offset by the decrease in the
number of cases filed. Although any attempt to answer this question
must be speculative, the experience in negligence cases suggests that
these effects would be slight. Certainly no evidence indicates that addi-
tional administrative burdens, if any, would be significant enough to
influence the decision whether to use comparative fault in intentional
tort cases.
VI. CONCLUSION
In cases in which both parties were at fault in causing plaintiff's
injury, the courts have long endured the uncomfortable position of hav-
ing to ignore the fault of one party to the benefit of the other. Most
jurisdictions have resolved this predicament when it arises in negligence
and strict liability cases by using comparative fault. In the instance of
intentional torts, however, the courts continue to decide cases on an all-
or-nothing basis, usually by ignoring plaintiff's fault and imposing the
entire liability on defendant. With the advent of comparative fault, a
reassessment of this remnant of the all-or-nothing approach is in order.
People, be they plaintiffs or defendants, should bear some responsi-
bility for the injuries caused by their faulty conduct. In particular, a
person who was at fault in causing her own injury generally should not
be permitted to foist the entire liability for that injury onto someone
else. Furthermore, in a system in which defendant's liability is based on
fault, equal treatment demands that the fault of plaintiff also be con-
sidered in assessing damages. Both of these principles indicate that
comparative fault should be used in many intentional tort cases, for
doing so recognizes the faults of both parties and requires both faulty
parties to bear responsibility for the loss they caused. An additional
benefit is that comparative fault may help to spread the losses caused
by intentional torts.
Nevertheless, there are instances in which a defendant's conduct is
such that he should be prevented from complaining of plaintiff's fault.
When defendant wanted to inflict the damage of which plaintiff com-
plains, aware of facts under which he had no right to inflict such dam-
1993]
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age, or when defendant took advantage of plaintiff's fault, defendant
usually has used plaintiff's fault for his own purposes and consequently
has forfeited any right he had to complain about that fault. Plaintiff,
however, should not completely escape responsibility if she was at fault
in provoking defendant to commit the tort even though as a result of
the provocation defendant wanted to inflict the injury of which plaintiff
complains. In that instance defendant, not having used plaintiff's fault
for his own purposes or in any way having benefitted from it, should
not be prevented from relying on that fault to reduce his liability.
Thus, most types of intentional tort cases would be more fairly de-
cided if the courts could consider the fault of both parties. In such cases
comparative fault should be used, thereby enabling the courts to equi-
tably allocate losses.
